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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL 
ARGUMENT 
I. ESI Fails To Demonstrate Either (1) The Alleged Implausibility Of MYFs 
Interpretation Of The Term "Indemnitors9 Assets" As Not Including The 
Subject Claims, Or (2) The Alleged Reasonableness OfESPs Interpretation Of 
The Term "Indemnitors5 Assets55 As Not Limited To The Eight Categories Of 
Assets By Which That Term Was Defined So As To Include The Subject Claims 
The validity of the Order of Dismissal turns upon whether the Subject Claims were 
transferred to and owned by Mr. Seely under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement.1 The 
threshold issue as to whether the Subject Claims were transferred to Mr. Seely is whether the 
contract language reasonably allows for the interpretation that the Subject Claims were not 
transferred to Mr. Seely. If so, the "Ward rule" requires the interpretation of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement in accordance with relevant and credible extrinsic evidence regarding 
the parties' intentions as to whether the Subject Claims were transferred to Mr. Seely. See 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n., 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995); Dairies v. Vincent, 
2008 UT 51,1ffl 26-31, 190 P.3d 1269. ESI does not take issue with the "Ward rule." 
MYI demonstrated in its Brief of Appellant that a reasonable interpretation of the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement was that it did not provide for the transfer of the Subject 
Claims for the following reasons: (1) the March 2004 Settlement Agreement expressly 
provided that only the "Indemnitors' Assets" were transferred to Developers and then to Mr. 
Seely; (2) the term "Indemnitors5 Assets" was expressly defined to be limited to only eight 
categories of specifically listed assets rather than all of MYFs assets; and (3) the Subject 
1
 The capitalized terms in this brief have the same meaning as in the Brief of 
Appellant. 
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Claims, unlike other accounts receivable, were not expressly listed in any of the eight 
categories of assets that comprised the "Indemnitors' Assets," and none of those eight 
categories could be reasonably interpreted to cover the Subject Claims. 
MYI submits that not only is it reasonable to interpret the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement to not include the Subject Claims in the assets that were transferred to Mr. Seely, 
but that the only reasonable interpretation of "Indemnitors5 Assets" is that the Subject Claims 
were not transferred. This is because ESI, in its Brief of Appellee, fails to demonstrate either 
that MYFs interpretation is implausible or that ESI's interpretation of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement as providing for the transfer of the Subject Claims is reasonable. As 
such, under the "Ward rule," the March 2004 Settlement Agreement cannot be interpreted 
as providing for the transfer of the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely. 
A* ESI Fails to Demonstrate that Its Interpretation of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement Is Reasonable and, Thus, Does Not Show that 
MYFs Interpretation Is Implausible 
ESI attempts to demonstrate that MYFs interpretation is implausible by both 
interpreting what assets were transferred under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement by 
reference to statements in the Recitals of that agreement, without regard to the defined term 
"Indemnitors' Assets/' and by interpreting the term "Indemnitors' Assets" to not be limited 
to the eight categories of assets by which that term was defined. ESI argues that the March 
2004 Settlement Agreement, read in its entirety, "clearly and unambiguously contemplates 
the transfer of all of Indemnitors' [MYFs and the Youngs'] assets to Developers and the 
subsequent sale of some of those assets by Developers to Mr. Seely." (ESFs Br. of Appellee 
-2-
at 19.) ESI also argues that the language of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement allegedly 
"negates MYTs narrow interpretation of [the term "Indemnitors' Assets"] as including only 
the assets listed in categories 1 though 8" (ESFs Br. of Appellee at 20 (emphasis in 
original)). 
ESI fails to show that it is implausible to limit the assets that were transferred to Mr. 
Seely to the "Indemnitors' Assets" and to limit the "Indemnitors' Assets" to the eight 
categories of assets by which that term was expressly defined. ESI also fails to show that it 
is reasonable to interpret what assets were transferred to Mr. Seely without reference to the 
defined term "Indemnitors' Assets," or to interpret the term "Indemnitors' Assets" to include 
assets in addition to the eight categories of assets by which that term was defined. 
Fundamentally, the only provisions of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement that 
provided for the transfer of assets were paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d) and they did not state that 
all of MYI's assets were being transferred. Instead, paragraph 2(b) stated that only the 
"Indemnitors' Assets" were transferred from MYI and the Youngs, and paragraph 2(d) stated 
that only the "Indemnitors' Assets" (with two exceptions) were transferred from Developers 
to Mr. Seely. (R. 1676-77 (Tab A at 5-6, % 2).)2 Paragraph 2 stated, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
In consideration of such resolution and assignments, Developers, Indemnitors 
[MYI and the Youngs], and Seely Agree as follows:... 
b) Indemnitors confirm and aver that Indemnitors have assigned, 
2
 Citations to Tabs A through I are to the documents included in the Addendum to 
MYI's Brief of Appellant at the cited tab. Citations to Tabs J through O are to documents 
included in the Addendum to the portion of this Brief that responds to ESFs cross-appeal. 
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transferred and set over to Developers any and all interests, rights, and title that 
Indemnitors possess or may possess to Indemnitors5 Assets. 
c) Concurrent with Developers' execution of this Agreement, Seely 
shall pay Developers a lump sum payment of One Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($150,000) in certified funds. 
d) In consideration of Seely's payment to Developers of One 
Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000) in certified funds, Developers . 
. . . hereby assigns, transfers, and sets over to Seely all Indemnitors' Assets 
(R. 1676-77 (Tab A at 5-6, f 2) (emphasis added).) Given that the only operative transfer 
provisions stated that only the "Indemnitors' Assets" were transferred, and did not state that 
all of MYFs assets were transferred, it plainly is not implausible to interpret the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement as providing for the transfer of only the "Indemnitors' Assets." Nor 
is it reasonable to interpret the agreement as providing for the transfer of assets that were not 
included in the "Indemnitors' Assets." 
The term "Indemnitors' Assets" was expressly defined in Recital F to be limited to 
eight categories of assets, rather than to consist of all of MYI's assets. (R. 1673-74 (Tab A 
at 2-3, Recital F).) The term "Indemnitors' Assets" was defined in Recital F by reference to 
Developers'execution order from Developers' Separate Action. (Id.) As shown in Recital 
F, that execution order had allowed Developers to execute upon all of MYI's assets, 
including but not limited to eight categories of specifically listed assets that were set forth 
in paragraphs 1 though 8 of the execution order. (Id.) However, the term "Indemnitors' 
Assets" expressly was defined to be limited to only the eight categories of specific assets 
listed in paragraphs 1 through 8. (R. 1674 (Tab A at 3).) Specifically, the parties added to 
-4-
the end of the Recital F quotation of paragraph 8 of the execution order the following 
language: "All assets referenced in paragraphs 1 through 8 of [the execution order] are 
referred to in this Agreement as 'Indemnitors' Assets."' (Id. (emphasis added).) This 
language did not appear in the execution order. The Recital F modified quotation of the 
execution order, referred to as "the Court's Order/' was as follows: 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that pursuant to URCP 64C and URCP 64D, Developers may 
execute, attach and garnish, in the amount of $540,668.61, the accounts 
receivable, assets, interest, money, stocks, memberships, bonds, real 
property, and personal property in which the Indemnitors [MYI and the 
Youngs] have an interest, including but not limited to the following: 
L Merrick Young 
Stephanie Young 
3511 Paiute Road 
St. George or Bloomington, Utah 84790-7741 
The above real property known as 3511 Paiute 
Road and any funds obtained from its sale, 
including all other assets of the Indemnitors. 
8. Any interest in Black Ridge Commercial Center, 
LLC; Black Ridge, LLC, or any other partnership, 
limited partnership, limited liability company, 
sole proprietorship, corporation, or other business 
entity in which any Indemnitor has an interest, 
and any real property in which these entities have 
an interest. [All assets referenced in 
paragraphs 1 though 8 of the Court's Order 
are referred to in this Agreement as 
"Indemnitors' Assets"]. 
(R. 1673-74 (Tab A at 2-3, Recital F (emphasis added)).) 
Given this language and paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d), ESI fails to show that it is 
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implausible to interpret the contract language as providing for the transfer to Mr. Seely of 
only the eight categories of assets listed in paragraphs 1 through 8 of the Recital F quotation 
of the execution order (less the specific "Indemnitors' Assets" left with Developers under 
paragraph 2(d)). Given this language, it is unreasonable to interpret the contract language 
as providing for the transfer of assets not included in the "Indemnitors' Assets." 
ESI cobbles together various statements in the Recitals of the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement to make its argument. However, none of those statements is an operative transfer 
provision. None of those statements demonstrates an intent either thai the assets being 
transferred were not limited to the "Indemnitors' Assets" or that the "Indemnitors' Assets" 
were not limited to the eight categories of assets by which that term was defined. 
ESI relies upon the language in Recital D that stated that MYI and the Youngs (the 
"Indemnitors") had entered into the Indemnity Agreement with Developers (referred to as 
the "GIA"), under which they pledged all of their accounts receivable to Developers as 
collateral, and the language in Recital F that quoted Developers' execution order as providing 
that Developers "may" execute upon all of MYFs assets. (R. 1672-73 (Tab A at 1, 2, 
Recitals D, F).). However, the term "Indemnitors' Assets" was not defined by reference to 
either the GIA, MYFs and the Youngs' pledge of assets to Developers, nor to the entire 
execution order that Developers had obtained. As such, neither MYFs pledge of all of its 
assets to Developers, nor the fact that Developers had obtained an execution order allowing 
it to execute upon all of MYFs assets, meant that the "Indemnitors' Assets" covered all of 
MYFs assets. Moreover, the issue is whether the Subject Claims were transferred to and 
-6-
owned by Mr. Seely. ESFs theory would show only a transfer of the Subject Claims to 
Developers, not to Mr. Seely. 
What is relevant to determining the parties' intent based upon the language of the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement is the fact that Developers' execution order had allowed 
it to execute on all of MYFs' assets, including the eight categories of specific assets listed 
in paragraphs 1 though 8 of the execution order, but the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement defined the term "Indemnitors' Assets" to be limited to only the eight 
categories of specific assets listed in paragraphs 1 though 8. This demonstrated the 
parties' intent that the "Indemnitors' Assets" did not include all of MYFs assets. The fact 
that the parties limited the definition of the term "Indemnitors' Assets" to only the eight 
categories of specific assets listed in paragraphs 1 through 8 can be explained only as an 
intention to include less than all of MYFs assets in the "Indemnitors' Assets." This is 
bolstered by the fact that the eight categories themselves, on their face, do not cover all of 
MYFs assets. 
Moreover, contrary to ESFs assumption with its argument, MYFs pledge of all of its 
accounts receivable to Developers as collateral and Developers obtaining the execution order 
did not mean that, prior to the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, Developers already owned 
all of MYFs accounts receivable. A mere pledge of an asset as collateral is not a transfer of 
title to the asset. See Gowans v. Rockport Irr. Co,, 293 P. 4, 6 (Utah 1930). Before 
Developers could have owned the pledged accounts receivable, MYI and the Youngs had to 
default and Developers had to institute an action to assert its equitable interest in the pledged 
-7-
assets, obtain an execution order, and then actually seize the accounts receivable. This is the 
only explanation for Developers' Separate Action and Developers' execution order. With 
that execution order, Developers was poised to become the owner of all of MYFs accounts 
receivable because it could seize them. However, Developers entered into the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement instead of seizing all of MYFs accounts receivable. If Developers 
already had owned all of MYFs assets, including all of its accounts receivable, before 
entering into the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, there would have been no need for the 
parties to limit the assets that were transferred under that agreement to the eight categories 
of assets by which the "Indemnitors' Assets" were defined. Paragraph 2(b) confirmed that 
only the "Indemnitors' Assets" had been transferred to Developers. (R. 1676 (Tab A at 5, 
II 2(b)).) 
ESI also relies upon the language in Recital H that stated Mr. Seely was interested in 
purchasing "assets of Indemnitors owned by Developers or which are subject to the 
judgment, injunction, and garnishment." (R. 1676 (Tab A at 5, Recital H).) However, 
contrary to ESFs contention (ESI Br. of Appellee at 19), Recital H did not state either that 
MYI had or was transferring "all" of its assets to Developers or that Mr. Seely's interest was 
in purchasing "all" of MYI' s assets .ESI ignores that Recital H stated in its first sentence that 
Mr. Seely was interested in purchasing "certain assets of MYI," thus supporting the 
interpretation of "Indemnitors' Assets" as not including all of MYFs assets. (R. 1676 (Tab 
A at 5, Recital H (emphasis added)).) 
ESI also relies upon the language of paragraph 2(d)(ii) that stated Developers 
-8-
transferred to Mr. Seely "all Indemnitors' Assets with the exception of the Black Ridge Drive 
Project, the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation, and Developers' Black Ridge Drive 
Project Litigation/5 (R. 1677 (Tab A at 6, f 2(d)(ii)).) ESI argues that this "exception" 
clause demonstrates that MYPs and Developers' Black Ridge Drive Project litigations were 
intended to be included in the "Indemnitors' Assets," but those litigations allegedly were not 
listed in the eight categories of assets defining the "Indemnitors' Assets." As such, ESI 
argues, the term "Indemnitors' Assets" cannot be limited to those eight categories of assets. 
ESFs argument is not supported by the language of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. 
First, category 2 did include "MYPs BlackRidge Drive Project Litigation." Category 
2 stated "[f|unds due and owing to [MYI and the Youngs]... for the project known as Black 
Ridge Drive, 250 West Improvement, Project SIC 99-4, Inquiry No. 00-1260." (R. 1674 
(Tab A at 3, Recital F).) This reference to all accounts receivable related to the Black Ridge 
Drive Project plainly included "MYI's Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation." Indeed, if one 
of the eight categories had included "funds due and owing" to MYI for the Wal-Mart Project 
that was the subject of the Subject Claims, then the Subject Claims clearly would have been 
included. The fact that accounts receivable for the Wal-Mart Project were not listed shows 
that the Subject Claims were not intended to be included in the "Indemnitors' Assets." See 
Mifflin v. Shiki, 293 P. 1, 3 (Utah 1930). ESI has no answer to this point. 
Second, contrary to ESFs argument, the provision in paragraph 2(d)(ii) stating that 
Developers transferred the "Indemnitors' Assets" to Mr. Seely "with the exception of" the 
listed Black Ridge Drive Project related assets could not have expressed an intent that all of 
-9-
those Black Ridge Drive Project related assets were included in the "Indemnitors' Assets." 
This is because one of those listed Black Ridge Drive Project related assets was 
"Developers9 Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation." (R. 1677 (Tab A at 6, If 2(d)).) 
"Developers' Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation" was never an asset of MYI. Therefore, 
that chose in action never could have been included in the "Indemnitors' Assets" in the first 
instance so as to have been excluded from the "Indemnitors' Assets" that were transferred 
to Mr. Seely under paragraph 2(d)(ii). Plainly, the "exception" clause in paragraph 2(d)(ii) 
merely identified particular assets that were not being transferred to Mr. Seely (only some 
of which were "Indemnitors' Assets"), rather than identified only particular "Indemnitors' 
Assets" that were not being transferred to Mr. Seely. 
Finally, ESI argues that paragraph 2(g) shows the parties intended that all of MYI's 
assets were transferred to Developers and then to Mr. Seely. Paragraph 2(g) stated: 
As stated in paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d). . . all of Indemnitors' assets and all 
interests therein (except those reserved to Developers), which have been or 
could have been attached by Developers via the GIA or otherwise, are hereby 
conveyed to Developers and then to Seely. Developers retains no interest in 
any such assets. 
(R. 1677 (Tab A at 6,12(g) (emphasis added)).) However, this contract language merely 
restated the parties' intent that all of the "Indemnitors' Assets" were transferred under the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement. Paragraph 2(g) only restated the parties' intent that was 
stated in the referenced operative transfer provisions of paragraph 2(b) and 2(d). That intent 
was that MYI had transferred to Developers, and Developers transferred to Mr. Seely, only 
the "Indemnitors' Assets" (with exceptions). The fact that the word "assets" in the term 
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"Indemnitors' Assets" in paragraph 2(g) mistakenly was not capitalized cannot be read to 
express an intent that is contrary to the intent plainly expressed in the primary operative 
transfer paragraphs of paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d). Thus, paragraph 2(g)'s use of "all" simply 
means all of the "Indemnitors' Assets," and not all of MYFs assets. 
In sum, ESI does not show, with any of the contract language that it relies upon, either 
that it is implausible to interpret the March 2004 Settlement Agreement to limit the assets 
that were transferred under it to the eight categories of assets by which the "Indemnitors' 
Assets" were defined, or that it is reasonable to interpret that agreement to provide for the 
transfer of all of MYFs assets. 
B. ESFs Limited Attempt to Demonstrate that the Subject Claims Were 
Covered by One of the Eight Categories of Specifically Listed Assets by 
Which the Term "Indemnitors' Assets" Was Defined Fails 
MYI demonstrates with its Brief of Appellant that none of the eight categories of 
assets that comprised the "Indemnitors' Assets" covered the Subject Claims, such that the 
Subject Claims were not transferred to Mr. Seely (because only the "Indemnitors' Assets" 
were transferred to Mr. Seely). ESI attempts to show otherwise by arguing that category 7 
covered the Subject Claims. Notably, this is ESFs only attempt to demonstrate that the 
Subject Claims were covered by one of the eight categories of assets that comprised the 
"Indemnitors' Assets." ESI does not attempt to defend the district court's ruling that the 
Subject Claims were covered by category 6. ESI, thereby, concedes that none of the 
categories other than allegedly category 7 covered the Subject Claims. 
Category 7 covered "[a]ny money, stocks, bonds, or other assets of any Indemnitor." 
-11-
(R. 1674 (Tab A at 3, Recital F).) ESI contends that the "or other assets" language meant all 
of MYFs assets so as to include the Subject Claims. However, category 7 was just one of 
eight categories of specific assets included in the "Indemnitors' Assets," so it makes no sense 
that the phrase "or other assets" in category 7 meant all of MYFs assets. Otherwise, the 
remaining seven categories would have been redundant, and defining the "Indemnitors' 
Assets" by reference to the eight categories of assets would have served no purpose. See 
Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, f 28,210 P.3d 263. Category 
7 plainly refers to specific liquid assets. As such, by law, the reference to "other assets" in 
category 7 necessarily was to other assets of a similar character, that is, other liquid assets. 
See Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ffi[ 25, 34,207 P.3d 1235. 
The Subject Claims manifestly do not have the same character (liquid assets as opposed to 
a chose in action) as the assets covered by category 7. Therefore, as a matter of law, category 
7 does not express an intent to cover the Subject Claims. Id. ESI summarily argues this 
interpretation lacks merit without support or analysis. 
In sum, ESI fails to show that it is implausible to interpret category 7 to not cover the 
Subject Claims. Nor does ESI demonstrate that it is reasonable to interpret category 7 to 
cover all of MYFs assets so as to include the Subject Claims. Given that this was ESFs only 
attempt to show that the Subject Claims were covered by any of the eight categories of assets 
by which the term "Indemnitors' Assets" was defined and only the "Indemnitors' Assets" 
were transferred to Mr. Seely under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, ESI fails to 
demonstrate either that it is implausible to exclude the Subject Claims from the assets that 
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were transferred to Mr. Seely, or that it is reasonable that the Subject Claims were transferred 
to Mr. Seely, considering only the language of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. As 
such, MYI does not offer extrinsic evidence "in an attempt to obscure otherwise plain 
contractual terms." See Dairies, 2008 UT 51 at j^ 31. 
II. Extrinsic Evidence Of The Parties' Intentions Should Be Considered And That 
Evidence Conclusively Shows That There Was No Intent To Transfer The 
Subject Claims 
Because MYI offered extrinsic evidence to support a reasonable interpretation of the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement, extrinsic evidence regarding the intentions of the parties 
to the March 2004 Settlement Agreement as to the transfer of the Subject Claims should be 
considered, under the "Ward rule/' in order to resolve the issue of whether the only 
reasonable interpretation of that agreement is that the Subject Claims were not transferred 
to Mr. Seely under that agreement. Ward, 907 P.2d at 268; Dairies, 2008 UT 51 at ffif 26-31. 
Or, if ESFs interpretation that the Subject Claims were transferred to Mr. Seely also is 
deemed reasonable (which should not be the outcome), such extrinsic evidence should be 
considered in order to resolve the resulting facial ambiguity. Ward, 907 P.2d at 268; Dairies, 
2008 UT 51 at fflf 26-31. 
ESI argues that the district court properly considered the extrinsic evidence regarding 
the intentions of the parties to the March 2004 Settlement Agreement as to the transfer of the 
Subject Claims by finding that the evidence proved a "different" intent than that allegedly 
expressed by the unambiguous language of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. 
However, the "Ward rule" requires the consideration of the extrinsic evidence in order to 
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determine whether the March 2004 Settlement Agreement is facially ambiguous and then, 
if it is facially ambiguous, to interpret the March 2004 Settlement Agreement in a manner 
consistent with that extrinsic evidence. See Ward, 907 P.2d at 268; Dairies, 2008 UT 51 at 
fflf 26-31. The district court plainly did neither. 
ESI also argues that certain of the extrinsic evidence relied upon by MYI is not 
"credible" and, thus, cannot be considered by this Court under the "Ward rule." This 
argument leaves ESI short from disqualifying all of the extrinsic evidence from consideration 
and, in any event, fails to raise an issue of fact as to the parties' intentions.3 
ESI leaves itself short because it does not challenge the credibility of either (1) Mr. 
Seely's declaration testimony that he did not understand that the Subject Claims had been 
transferred to him (R. 3217-17b (Tab E)), or (2) Developers' representation to ESFs counsel 
that Developers did not understand that the Subject Claims had been transferred to 
Developers (R. 1432). ESI cites no evidence that shows that either Mr. Seely or Developers 
actually had a different understanding. Indeed, ESI cites no extrinsic evidence supporting 
its interpretation of the term "Indemnitors' Assets." Given that the evidence of Mr. Seely's 
and Developer' s understandings is uncontroverted and they were the alleged transferees, that 
evidence is controlling. Mr. Seely's understanding, supported by Developers' understanding, 
conclusively shows under the "Ward rule" either that the only reasonable interpretation of 
the March 2004 Settlement Agreement was that the Subject Claims were not transferred to 
3
 At best for ESI, its challenge would raise an issue of fact as to the parties' intentions 
that would need to be decided based upon the allegedly conflicting extrinsic evidence. See 
Dairies, 2008 UT 51 at f 24. The March 2004 Settlement Agreement still would need to be 
interpreted in accordance with the intent of the parties, once that intent was sorted out. Id. 
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Mr. Seely or that any alleged ambiguity as to the transfer of the Subject Claims must be 
resolved by an interpretation consistent with Mr. Seely's and Developers' understanding. See 
Ward, 907 P.2d at 268; Dairies, 2008 UT 51 at ffi[ 26-31. 
ESI challenges only the credibility of the extrinsic evidence offered by MYI as to the 
understanding of MYFs principal that the Subject Claims had remained with MYI. ESFs 
challenge is not successful. 
ESI challenges the credibility of the offered testimony of MYFs principal primarily 
on the basis of an April 12, 2004 letter from Dennis Farley, MYFs then-counsel of record 
in the case below, to ESFs counsel of record, by which Mr. Farley transmitted to ESFs 
counsel a March 30,2004 letter from Robert Jensen, MYFs counsel in Developers' Separate 
Action, to Mr. Farley. (R. 3708-52.) In his letter, Mr. Jensen wrote to update Mr. Farley as 
to the "financial status" of MYI. (R. 3709.) Mr. Jensen wrote that: 
The following Court pleadings clearly establish that [MYI] is currently 
controlled and essentially owned by [Developers] Pursuant to the attached 
documents, [Developers] essentially owns [MYI], its assets, all accounts 
receivables, etc. 
(R. 3709.) ESI argues this letter would controvert testimony by MYFs principal that the 
Subject Claims had not been transferred to Mr. Seely under the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement. However, the letter, on its face, would have no such effect. 
First, Mr. Jensen manifestly was not writing about the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement. This is shown by the fact that he did not include that agreement in the 
documents he referenced and attached to his letter. (R. 3709-52.) Mr. Jensen, instead, was 
writing about the interim asset freeze order and the execution order that Developers had 
-15-
obtained in Developers' Separate Action. (R. 3709.) This is demonstrated by the only 
documents referred to in and attached to his letter, which were: (1) Developers' complaint 
initiating Developers' Separate Action; (2) the interim asset freeze order and its stipulated 
extension; and (3) the execution order. (R. 3709-52.) These were the only documents upon 
which Mr. Jensen based his assertion that Developers "controlled" and "essentially owned" 
all of MYFs accounts receivable. (R. 3709.) Under Developers' interim asset freeze order 
and execution order, Developers did control and "essentially" owned MYFs assets; MYI was 
prohibited from disposing of any of its assets and Developers was then poised to seize all of 
MYFs assets. However, Developers entered into the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, 
resolving the asset freeze, in lieu of executing on any or all of MYFs assets. As such, Mr. 
Jensen's assertion that Developers "essentially" owned all of MYFs accounts receivables 
was supplanted by the March 2004 Settlement Agreement (which Developers executed on 
April 5,2005, subsequent to Mr. Jensen's letter (R. 3178)). Mr. Farley merely forwarded on 
Mr. Jensen's letter and its attachments, repeating Mr. Jensen's assertion, based upon the same 
orders and not the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 3708.) As such, Messrs. Jensen's 
and Farley's assertions had nothing to do with MYFs intentions under March 2004 
Settlement Agreement. 
Second, at issue is whether the March 2004 Settlement Agreement transferred the 
Subject Claims to Mr. Seely, as the validity of the Order of Dismissal turns on Mr. Seely's 
alleged ownership of the Subject Claims. Mr. Jensen's letter clearly took no position as to 
Mr. Seely's ownership of any asset of MYI, much less the Subject Claims. This further 
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demonstrates that Mr. Jensen was not addressing the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. 
As such, Mr. Jensen's letter, and Mr. Farley's forwarding of the letter, is not 
"evidence" that would controvert testimony by MYFs principal that he understood that the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement did not transfer the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely. 
Otherwise, ESI bases its challenge to the credibility of such testimony by MYFs 
principal upon arguments, contentions and statements made by MYFs counsel in MYFs 
filings in the case below. MYI addresses each of these arguments, contentions and 
statements below, as ESI also argues they support its theory that MYFs entire post-April 
2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims was a "continuing" violation of U.R.C.P. 11. MYI 
consistently took the position below, in response to ESFs focus upon the issue of the 
ownership of the Subject Claims in order to defend against those claims, that MYI continued 
to own the Subject Claims after April 2004. (R. 3186, 3192 at f 32,3195 at f 52.) Of note, 
ESI points to no evidence showing that MYFs principal directed MYFs counsel to take the 
position that Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims such as would contradict testimony by the 
principal that he did not understand that Mr. Seely took ownership of the Subject Claims 
under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. What is left is the fact that MYFs continued 
prosecution of the Subject Claims after April 2004, as if it owned the claims, supports its 
interpretation of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. 
In sum, ESI neither challenges the credibility of Mr. Seely's and Developers' 
understanding that the Subject Claims were not transferred under the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement, nor cites to any extrinsic evidence that supports its interpretation of that 
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agreement. As such, that agreement should be interpreted consistent with Mr. Seely's and 
Developers' understanding, as they were the intended transferees. ESI fails to raise an issue 
of fact as to the parties' intentions with its challenge to the credibility of the offered 
testimony of MYFs principal. 
CONCLUSION 
ESI fails to demonstrate that the March 2004 Settlement Agreement should be 
interpreted to have transferred the Subject Claims from MYI to Mr. Seely. MYFs 
interpretation is the only reasonable interpretation. The language of that agreement and the 
understanding of the parties to that agreement dictate that there was no intent to transfer the 
Subject Claims to Developers and then to Mr. Seely. As such, the Order of Dismissal, which 
depended upon Mr. Seely being the owner of the Subject Claims, should be reversed and the 
action remanded with instructions as to the proper interpretation of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement regarding the transfer of the Subject Claims. 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE, RESPONDING 
TO BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
ESI cross-appeals the denial of its motion for sanctions against MYI and its counsel 
under U.R.C.P. 11 ("Rule 11"). ESI sought to have MYI and its counsel sanctioned under 
Rule 11 for continuing to prosecute the Subject Claims after April 2004. ESFs theory was 
that, with the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, MYI allegedly had "lost" the right to 
prosecute the Subject Claims because those claims allegedly had been transferred to Mr. 
Seely under that agreement. ESI sought, as Rule 11 sanctions, the dismissal of the Amended 
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Complaint, by which the Subject Claims had been asserted, and an award of all of its post-
April 2004 attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the action below. The issues presented by 
ESFs cross-appeal are: 
1. Could MYI and its counsel have violated Rule 11 (b) by continuing to prosecute 
the Subject Claims after April 2004 when there was no pendente lite transfer of the Subject 
Claims and, even if there had been, when U.R.C.P. 25(c) ("Rule 25(c)") legally authorized 
the continued prosecution, as ruled by the district court? (R. 3993-4013,4014-4100.) 
2. Did ESI misuse Rule 11 to seek a final disposition of the Subject Claims in its 
favor based upon its claim that there had been & pendente lite transfer of the Subject claims 
when ESFs Rule 11 motion turned on the merits of that claim and ESI sought the dismissal 
of the Amended Complaint with prejudice as a sanction even though ESI did not claim the 
Amended Complaint had been filed in violation of Rule 11? (R. 3993-4013,4014-4100.) 
3. Even incorrectly assuming MYI and its counsel could have violated Rule 11 (b) 
by continuing to prosecute the Subject Claims after April 2004, did they violate Rule 11(b) 
by doing so and asserting MYFs continued right to prosecute those claims when: (1) ESI 
first asserted its claim that there had been a pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims in 
January 2007; (2) Mr. Seely and Developers, the alleged transferees, each understood there 
had not been a pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims; and (3) there is no evidence that 
conclusively established there had been & pendente lite transfer of those claims? (R. 3993-
4013,4014-4100.) 
"Decisions regarding Rule 11 sanctions are best left in the hands of the trial court." 
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Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76, }^ 7, 197 P.3d 650. Therefore, a trial court's decision 
regarding Rule 11 sanctions is accorded "reasonable discretion." Id. Review of a denial of 
a Rule 11 motion can involve two different standards of review. Findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clear error standard, while conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.4 
Id. at \ 6. Whether a party seeks a Rule 11 motion on a basis provided for by the rule is a 
question of law. See, e.g., Chase v. Shop 'n Save Warehouse Foods, Inc. 110 F.3d 424,430 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition In The Court 
Below 
MYI incorporates by reference herein section I of its "Statement of the Case" in its 
Brief of Appellant. To that discussion, MYI adds the following facts regarding the course 
of proceedings and disposition in the court below that pertain to ESFs cross-appeal: 
1. On July 11, 2008, ESI filed its Motion For Sanctions Against MYI And Its 
Counsel Of Record under Rule 11, seeking the sanction of dismissal with prejudice of the 
Amended Complaint and award of all its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the case below 
after April 2004 (the "Rule 11 Motion5'). (R. 3297-98,3300-20 (Tab J (7/11/08 Defendant 
ESFs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions Against MYI And Its' Counsel of 
Record)).) The Rule 11 Motion was ESFs third motion for Rule 11 sanctions below and was 
4
 ESI mistakenly applies an "abuse of discretion" standard of review in section III of 
its Brief of Appellee. The "abuse of discretion" standard applies to a review of the "type and 
amount" of Rule 11 sanctions that are imposed. See Archuleta, 2008 UT 76 at % 6. That 
standard is not applicable here because the district court did not impose any Rule 11 
sanctions, having determined there was no Rule 11 violation. 
-20-
based upon ESFs claim that MYI had transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely under the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 3300-20 (Tab J), 3994.) The Rule 11 Motion was 
ESFs first attempt to obtain a dismissal with prejudice of the Amended Complaint using the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement (the second attempt was ESFs November 24, 2008 
Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice). (R. 3297-98,4107-09.) 
2. MYI and its counsel opposed the Rule 11 Motion on August 7, 2008. (R. 
3993-4012 (Tab L (8/7/08 Merrick Young Incorporated^ And Its Counsel's Opposition To 
ESFs Motion for Sanctions Against MYI And Its Counsel Of Record)), R. 4014-4100,4101.) 
3. ESI submitted its Rule 11 Motion for decision on August 18, 2009 without 
filing a reply memorandum, stating that the issue of ownership of the Subject Claims already 
had been briefed thoroughly. (R. 4103-05 (TabM (8/18/08 Request To Submit For Decision 
And Request For Hearing)).) As such, ESI did not challenge MYFs assertions, in its 
opposition to the Rule 11 Motion: (a) of the theory of ESFs Rule 11 Motion and, in 
particular, that it hinged on ESFs claim that there had been a pendente lite transfer of the 
Subject Claims by which MYI allegedly had "lost" the right to prosecute those claims, (b) 
that ESI was not claiming any particular litigation statement was separately a Rule 11 
violation, (c) that ESI was not claiming harm or prejudice with its Rule 11 Motion, but 
merely was complaining of having to defend against the Subject Claims, and (d) that ESFs 
Rule 11 Motion was improperly filed to obtain a disposition of the Subject Claims. 
4. The district court denied the Rule 11 Motion by written ruling and order dated 
January 9,2009, and entered on January 21,2009 ("Order Denying ESFs Rule 11 Motion"). 
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(R. 4160.) In the Order Denying ESFs Rule 11 Motion, the district court found and ruled as 
follows: 
Having reviewed the voluminous material filed in support, and the 
considerable materials filed in opposition, the Court finds insufficient evidence 
of violation of Rule 11(b). The motion for sanctions is denied. The parties 
bear their own costs and fees for the motion. 
(R. 4160.) On March 13, 2009, the district court entered an amended Order Denying ESFs 
Rule 11 Motion, which certified that order as a final order for appeal pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
54(b). (R. 4191-92 (Tab O (3/13/09 Amended Order Denying ESFs Motion For Sanctions 
Against MYI And Its Counsel Of Record)).) 
II. Statement Of Facts Relevant To The Cross-Appeal 
MYI incorporates by reference herein section II of its "Statement of the Case" in its 
Brief of Appellant. To that discussion, MYI adds the following facts that are relevant to 
ESFs cross-appeal: 
1. The Subject Claims were asserted by MYI in the Amended Complaint, filed 
on June 7, 2001. (R. 13.) ESI does not claim that the Amended Complaint was filed in 
violation of Rule 11. To the contrary, ESI admitted below, and on appeal, that "ESI does 
not dispute that at the time of the initial filing of the Amended Complaint, MYI owned the 
alleged ESI account receivable." (R. 3305 (Tab J at 6)); see also ESFs Brief Appellee at 4, 
T| 3 ("There is no dispute that at the time of the filing of the Amended Complaint, MYI 
owned the alleged ESI account receivable.") 
2. ESFs Rule 11 Motion was based upon its claim that, after April 2004, MYI no 
longer owned the Subject Claims under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement and, thus, 
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allegedly had "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims. Based upon that claim, ESI 
contended that MYFs entire post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims was without 
basis in fact or law and, thus, allegedly a "continuing" Rule 11 violation. 
a. In its June 13, 2008 Rule 11(c)(1)(A) letter to MYFs counsel 
announcing its intention to file the Rule 11 Motion, ESFs counsel asserted that MYI 
had not presented "documentary or testimonial evidence" that MYI owned the Subj ect 
Claims. (R. 3344h (Tab K (6/13/08 letter at 10)).) ESFs counsel asserted as fact that 
MYI did not own the Subject Claims as a result of the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement such that MYFs continued assertions that it was the proper plaintiff were 
not warranted by existing law and without any evidentiary support. (R. 3344h-i (Tab 
K at 10-11).) ESI requested that, to avoid having the Rule 11 Motion filed, "MYI 
dismiss its claims against ESI, the Wal-Mart Trust and American Insurance 
Company." (R. 3344i (Tab K at 11).) 
b. ESI argued with its Rule 11 Motion that: 
Since March 25, 2004, [MYI] and its' counsel of record have 
repeatedly violated the provisions of Rule 11 by continuing in the 
prosecution of the [Subject Claims] without a legal basis to do so. 
(R. 3301 (Tab J at 2).) 
c. ESI argued with its Rule 11 Motion that, in April 2004, MYI allegedly 
"lost the right to pursue" and "lost the right to continue to prosecute" the Subject 
Claims, because the Subject Claims allegedly were transferred to Mr. Seely under the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 3304, 3305 (Tab J at 5, 6).) 
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d. ESI argued as follows with its Rule 11 Motion: 
Despite multiple opportunities for MYI and/or Seely to present 
documentary or testimonial evidence to the Court that the claims at 
issue are owned and/or otherwise controlled by MYI, such proof has 
not been made. MYFs continued assertion that it is a proper 
plaintiff and/or that it owns the claims against ESI, the Trust and 
American Insurance are not warranted by existing law and the 
allegation/arguments that have been made in support of such 
claim(s) have absolutely no evidentiary or legal support. Based on 
the foregoing, ESI can only conclude that MYFs prosecution of this 
claim after it assigned the alleged ESI account receivable asset to 
Developers in April 2004 was for the express purpose of harassing ESI 
and/or to cause unnecessary delay in the resolution of the matter or 
needless (and substantial) increase in the cost of litigation. 
(R. 3318-19 (Tab J at 19-20 (underscored emphasis in original, bold emphasis 
added)).) 
3. Before ESI filed its Rule 11 Motion, the district court ruled upon the propriety 
of MYFs post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims in response to ESFs February 
16,2007 Motion for Substitution under Rule 25(c). With that motion, ESI argued that there 
had been a transfer of interest to Mr. Seely under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, but 
did not argue that MYFs continued role as the plaintiff was wrongful. (R. 1470,1478-82.) 
Instead, ESI argued that Mr. Seely should be joined or substituted as a plaintiff for reasons 
of judicial economy. (R. 1478-82.) On May 21, 2007, the district court granted ESFs 
motion, ordering that Mr. Seely be joined as a plaintiff in addition to MYI. (R. 2906 (Tab 
N (5/21/07 Corrected Rulings on Pending Motions; Associated Orders) at 4).) The district 
court ruled as follows: 
There is no advantage to leaving Mr. Seely out of the case, and it is far too late 
for any party to complain about delaying litigation. While Rule 25(c) would 
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allow the case to proceed with only MYI as plaintiff, such a course would 
virtually guarantee future litigation among MYI, ESI and Mr. Seely. There is 
also an issue as to whether Mr Seely may be liable to ESI on some of its 
counterclaims against MYI, so it would not be prudent to substitute Mr. 
Seely in place of MYI. In the circumstances as they currently appear, the only 
reasonable course is to join Mr. Seely as a plaintiff. 
(R. 2906 (Tab N at 4 (emphasis added)).) 
4. Before the Rule 11 Motion was filed, the district court also addressed the 
propriety of MYFs continued role as plaintiff in the action in response to Mr. Seely's 
September 28,2007 Motion to Dismiss. In the April 16,2008 Ruling on Seely's Motion to 
Dismiss, the district court ruled as follows: 
The chose in action upon which MYI sued defendants in this case is one such 
asset, and Mr. Seely owns it. For these reasons, this Court has previously ruled 
that Mr. Seely as the assignee and real party in interest, should be joined as a 
plaintiff. 
This does not mean that Mr. Seely steps into MYFs shoes for all 
purposes. ESI does not seek to subject Mr. Seely to its original counterclaims 
against MYI, but ESI does assert that it has claims against Mr. Seely which 
accrued after he acquired his rights to MYFs claims in 2004. Having acquired 
all of the assets of MYI and its principals during the pendency of this action 
by MYI, Mr. Seely could and should have anticipated that this would subject 
him to the jurisdiction of this Court for his acts and omissions as to the 
ownership of the chose of action in this case. Consequently, there is nothing 
wrong or unreasonable or unfair in requiring Mr. Seely to respond to ESFs 
claims, and this Court has jurisdiction sufficient to do so. 
(R. 3283 (Tab B at 4 (emphasis added)).) 
5. ESFs defense of the Subject Claims after January 2007 focused almost 
exclusively upon its claim that MYI allegedly had transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. 
Seely under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement and, thus, allegedly had lost the right to 
prosecute the Subject Claims. Out of the approximately 26 pleadings, motions, memoranda 
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and objections on non-procedural issues filed below by ESI on or after January 19, 2007, 
when ESI made its Rule 17(a) objection, 15 involved the issue of the ownership of the 
Subject Claims. (R. 4015-17 at ^ 2.) ESI asserted claims for relief in its August 11, 2007, 
Second Amended Counterclaim based upon its claim that MYI had transferred the Subject 
Claims to Mr. Seely under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement and, thus, allegedly could 
no longer prosecute the claims. (R. 3014-32.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Whether ESFs Rule 11 Motion properly was denied presents only a question of law, 
such that the district court's finding that there was no evidence of a Rule 11 violation was 
sufficient to allow this Court to review it for correctness. 
ESI moved for Rule 11 sanctions on the basis that MYFs entire post-April 2004 
prosecution of the Subject Claims allegedly was without legal justification and a 
"continuing" Rule 11 violation. According to ESI, MYI allegedly had transferred the Subject 
Claims to Mr. Seely under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement and thus allegedly had 
"lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims. In reality, however, MYI did not transfer 
the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely. MYI demonstrates this with its briefs on its appeal of the 
Order of Dismissal. Moreover, Rule 25(c) provided a legal justification for MYFs continued 
prosecution of the Subject Claims after April 2004, even if there had been & pendente lite 
transfer of the Subject Claims. Rule 25(c) expressly provides that, "[i]n case of any transfer 
of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party . . . ." U.R.C.P. 
25(c) (emphasis added). 
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ESFs Rule 11 Motion also was properly denied as a matter of law because it was 
made for the purpose of obtaining a final disposition of the Subject Claims in ESFs favor, 
rather than seeking a remedy for any alleged harm or prejudice. ESFs only alleged "harm" 
was having to defend against the concededly valid Subject Claims after April 2004, which, 
as a matter of law, is not prejudice. ESFs misuse of Rule 11 to achieve a result not 
authorized by that rule is demonstrated by the fact that ESI sought the dismissal of the 
Amended Complaint with prejudice as the sanction, even though the Amended Complaint 
concededly had not been filed in violation of Rule 11. Rule 11 does not permit the dismissal 
with prejudice of a complaint that was not filed in violation of Rule 11. ESI also improperly 
sought as the sanction all of its post-April 2004 attorneys' fees, as if it were the prevailing 
party. ESFs misuse of Rule 11 to seek a final disposition of the Subject Claims also is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Rule 11 Motion, under ESFs theory of that motion, turned 
upon the merits of its claim that there had been ^pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims. 
That claim was entirely irrelevant to the merits of the concededly valid Subject Claims, yet 
was the basis of ESFs attempt to have the Subject Claims dismissed with prejudice. 
Lastly, even incorrectly assuming there had been & pendente lite transfer of the Subject 
Claims and ownership of the Subject Claims had mattered as to whether MYFs post-April 
2004 prosecution of those claims was legally justified, MYI still would not have violated 
Rule 11 by continuing to prosecute the Subject Claims because there was a factual and legal 
basis for it to contest ESFs claim that there had been a.pendente lite transfer. The language 
of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, as well as Mr. Seely's, Developers' and MYFs 
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understandings that there had been no transfer of the Subject Claims under that agreement, 
manifestly provided ample legal and factual justification for MYI to contest ESFs claim and 
to continue as the plaintiff 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
I. The District Court Made Sufficient Findings 
ESFs challenge to the sufficiency of the district court's findings in the Order Denying 
ESFs Rule 11 Motion ignores that its Rule 11 Motion was properly denied as a matter of law. 
The thrust of ESFs Rule 11 Motion was not any particular pleading or filing by MYI, 
but MYFs entire post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims, which ESI claimed was 
a "continuing" Rule 11 violation.5 With its Rule 11 Motion, ESI claimed that MYI and its 
counsel of record "have repeatedly violated the provisions of Rule 11 by continuing in the 
prosecution of the above-entitled matter without a legal basis to do so." (R. 3301 (Tab J at 
2).) The central claim underlying ESFs entire Rule 11 Motion was that MYI allegedly had 
transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement 
such that MYI allegedly had "lost the right to continue the prosecution of the instant case." 
(R. 3304,3305 (Tab J at 5,6).) ESI pointed to particular contentions, statements and denials 
of MYI, all concededly going to the issue of ownership of the Subject Claims, merely to 
support its claim that MYI allegedly had "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims 
under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. ESI cited those particular actions merely as 
5
 ESI did not challenge MYFs assertion in opposition to the ESFs Rule 11 Motion 
below that ESI was claiming MYFs entire post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims 
was the alleged Rule 11 violation. (R. 4103-05 (Tab M).) 
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instances where MYI allegedly concealed, or revealed, that it allegedly had "lost" the right 
to prosecute the Subject Claims. (R. 3304-18 (Tab J at 5-19).) ESI contended that, as a 
result of allegedly having "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims, MYFs entire post-
April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims allegedly was without basis in the law and a 
"continuing" violation of Rule 11 (b)(2). (R. 3318-19 (Tab J at 19-20).) Based upon its claim 
that MYI allegedly had "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims after April 2004, ESI 
also claimed it had to be assumed that MYFs post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject 
Claims was only to harass ESI and cause unnecessary delays in "continuing" violation of 
Rule 11(b)(1). (R. 3319 (Tab J at 20).) 
ESI did not seek Rule 11 sanctions based upon any claim that any particular filing was 
false in violation of Rule 11(b)(3) or (4). This is demonstrated by the fact that ESI did not 
seek the retraction of any particular allegation, statement or denial with its Rule 11 Motion, 
but sought the dismissal of the Amended Complaint with prejudice and an award of all of its 
post-April 2004 attorneys' fees. (R. 3319 (Tab J at 20).) 
As such, ESFs Rule 11 Motion only raised an issue of law - in particular, whether 
there was a legal or factual basis for MYFs post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject 
Claims, or a proper basis for the Rule 11 Motion itself. Thus, the district court was not 
required to make any findings beyond its finding that "the Court finds insufficient evidence 
of violation of Rule 11(b)." (R. 4192 (Tab O).) 
Indeed, the extent of findings in the Order Denying ESFs Rule 11 Motion was the 
equivalent of the conclusory findings regarding a denial of Rule 11 sanctions that this Court 
recently reviewed in Gillmor v. Family Link LLC, 2010 UT App 2, f 20,224 P.3d 741. In 
Gillmor, the trial court denied the defendants' Rule 11 motion claiming plaintiffs had filed 
a claim for relief for improper purposes in violation of Rule 11(b)(1). This Court described 
the trial court's findings as follows: 
[T]he district court wrote that it could "see no evidence of a purpose to harass, 
delay,.. . impose unnecessary cost[,] . . . or needlessly increase the costs of 
litigation." Rather, the district stated that [plaintiffs] purpose was clear: "to 
obtain access that has not been obtained through previously advanced 
theories." 
Id. Even though this Court's review in Gillmor involved a question of fact, these conclusory 
findings were sufficient. In the present case, the district court's conclusory finding that there 
was no evidence of a Rule 11 violation as a matter of law was sufficient. 
IL ESPs Rule 11 Motion Failed As A Matter Of Law Because MYI Never "Lost95 
The Right To Prosecute The Subject Claims 
ESPs underlying claim that MYI allegedly "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject 
Claims under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement fails as a matter of law. Therefore, 
ESPs Rule 11 Motion was correctly denied. 
A. MYPs Post-April 2004 Prosecution of the Subject Claims Was Legally 
Justified 
MYI never "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims in the first instance 
because, contrary to ESPs claim underlying its Rule 11 Motion, MYI did not transfer the 
Subject Claims to Mr. Seely under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. MYI 
demonstrates with its briefing on its appeal of the Order of Dismissal that 1he Subject Claims 
were not included in the "Indemnitors' Assets" that were transferred to Developers and then 
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to Mr. Seely under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. The entire predicate of MYFs 
Rule 11 Motion fails, so the motion fails as a matter of law. 
Moreover, MYI never "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims, even 
incorrectly assuming the Subject Claims had been transferred to Mr. Seely under the March 
2004 Settlement Agreement. 
Rule 25(c) allows a party, who was the real party in interest at the time an action was 
filed, to continue as the plaintiff even though there is & pendente lite transfer of the claims 
for relief. Rule 25(c) states: 
In the case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or 
against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to 
whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with 
the original party. 
U.R.C.P. 25(c). Under Rule 25(c), a plaintiff who was the original real party in interest may 
seamlessly continue as the plaintiff after ^pendente lite assignment of the subject claims for 
relief. Id. ("In the case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by . . . the 
original party" (emphasis added)). See also Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 255 P.2d 989,992 
(Utah 1953) ("We think Meagher's transfer of interest during pendency of the action does 
not deny him a continued role as plaintiff, nor does that role do violence to former Title 
104-3-19, U.C.A. 1943, or Rule 25(c), U.R.C.P., both of which allow prosecution of an 
action in the name of either grantor or grantee." (emphasis added)); Wright, Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 1958, at 555 ("The most significant feature of 
Rule 25(c) is that it does not require that anything be done after an interest has been 
transferred. The action may be continued by or against the original party, and the judgment 
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will be binding on successor in interest even though he is not named."). 
The purpose of Rule 25(c) is to allow for the original parties to continue a lawsuit to 
a determinative conclusion, despite any pendente lite transfer of interest, so as to avoid 
endless lawsuits. This purpose was noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Briggs v. Hess, 252 
P.2d 538 (Utah 1953): 
The answer to any contention that the court lost jurisdiction in the suit between 
Tree and Hess when the latter conveyed during the pendency of the action, 
well might be found in Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, designed to 
continue the litigation with the same litigants to a determinative conclusion. 
Were it otherwise, litigation might arrive at a stalemate by the simple device 
of a conveyance pendente lite, resulting in a series of endless lawsuits. 
Id. at 539. 
There is no dispute that MYI was the real party in interest when the Amended 
Complaint was filed. (R. 3305; Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellant at 4, f 3.) As such, 
MYTs continued role as plaintiff after April 2004 was proper under Rule 25(c), even if there 
had been ^pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims. Given that MYI concededly was the 
original real party in interest, it simply did not matter, under Rule 25(c), who owned the 
Subject Claims as to whether MYI was legally authorized to continue as the plaintiff. MYI 
never "lost the right to continue the prosecution of the instant case." 
The district court ruled that MYI' s continued role as the plaintiff after April 2004 was 
proper under Rule 25(c). Upon ESFs Rule 25(c) motion to join or substitute Mr. Seely as 
a plaintiff in this action, the district court ruled in May 2007 that "Rule 25(c) would allow 
the case to proceed with only MYI as plaintiff." (R. 2906 (Tab N at 4 (emphasis added)).) 
Recognizing the propriety of MYFs continued role as plaintiff, the district court then ordered 
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that Mr. Seely be joined as a plaintiff, in addition to MYI. (Id.) Even with its first ruling 
that Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims, the district court continued to view MYFs role as 
the plaintiff to be proper. (R. 3283 (Tab B at 4 ('This does not mean that Mr. Seely steps 
into MYFs shoes for all purposes.")).) 
ESI itself acknowledged that there was a basis for MYFs continued role as plaintiff 
after April 2004. ESFs February 2007 motion for substitution did not claim MYFs 
continued role as plaintiff was wrongful. Instead, the motion sought to have Mr. Seely either 
substituted or joined as a plaintiff. (R. 1470,1478-82.) ESI continued to assert claims in the 
Second Amended Counterclaim against MYI alone. (R. 3014-22.) ESI also asserted claims 
seeking declaratory judgment that Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims and MYI was not the 
real party in interest, which required MYI as the plaintiff. (R. 3022-26.) 
ESI argues on appeal that, for Rule 25(c) to have provided a legal justification for 
MYFs post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims, Mr. Seely (or Developers) had to 
have authorized MYI to continue to prosecute the Subject Claims after April 2004. ESI 
offers no legal authority for this argument, which is contrary to the plain terms of Rule 25(c), 
as well as to legal authority interpreting the rule. As noted above, Rule 25(c) allows the 
original plaintiff to seamlessly continue as the plaintiff after ^pendente lite transfer without 
any additional requirement. U.R.C.P. 25(c); Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Civil 2 d § 1958, at 555 ("The most significant feature of Rule 25(c) is that it does 
not require that anything be done after an interest has been transferred."). Moreover, neither 
Mr. Seely nor Developers could have provided such authorization because neither understood 
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that they had become the owner of the Subject Claims.6 
In sum, ESFs contention that MYFs entire post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject 
Claims was without legal justification and, therefore, a "continuing" Rule 11(b)(2) violation 
fails as a matter of law. There was no transfer of the Subject Claims under the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement. Moreover, even had there been, Rule 25(c) would have provided a 
clear and certain legal justification, as ruled by the district court, for MYFs continued 
prosecution of the Subject Claims. 
B. ESFs Claim that MYFs Entire Post-April 2004 Prosecution of the Subject 
Claims Was for Improper Purposes Fails as a Matter Of Law 
The fact that MYI never "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims also 
demonstrates that ESFs claim that MYFs entire post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject 
Claims was only to harass ESI and cause unnecessary delays fails as a matter of law. ESI did 
not offer any independent evidence, as required, supporting its claim that MYI prosecuted 
the Subject Claims after April 2004 only to harass ESI and to cause unnecessary delay.7 
6
 ESI' s argument on appeal that MYI' s assertion below in its January 2007 opposition 
to ESFs Rule 17(a) Objection that its prosecution of the Subject Claims was justified under 
Rule 25(c) "as the assignor of the claims" itself was a Rule 11 violation is bizarre. (ESFs 
Br. of Appellee at 36.) At the page of that opposition cited by ESI (R. 3845), MYI did not 
assert it was the "assignor" of the Subject Claims. In that opposition, MYI merely argued, 
while maintaining that no pendente lite assignment had taken place, that, if there had been 
a pendente lite assignment, its continued prosecution was justified under Rule 25(c). (R. 
3842-45 ("Even assuming that the [March 2004] Settlement Agreement transferred this 
action from MYI to Developers and then to Seely ").) This clearly is a correct statement 
of the law. MYI agrees with ESFs assertion on appeal that there was no record of an 
assignment of the Subject Claims. However, ESFs assertion is contrary to its claim 
underlying its Rule 11 Motion that there was an assignment of the Subject Claims. 
7
 As such, ESFs claim that MYFs entire post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject 
(continued...) 
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Instead, ESI merely assumed that MYFs post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims 
was only to harass and unduly delay, based strictly upon its central claim that, under the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement, MYI allegedly had "lost" the right to continue as the 
plaintiff (R. 3318-19 (Tab J at 20 ("Based on the foregoing, ESI can only conclude that 
MYFs prosecution of this claim after it assigned the alleged ESI account receivable asset to 
Developers in April 2004 was for the express purpose of harassing ESI and/or to cause 
unnecessary delay/')).) Since MYFs post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims was 
legally authorized, both because there was no pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims and 
by Rule 25(c) even if there had been such a transfer, there is no basis for ESFs assumption 
that MYFs entire post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims was only to harass and 
unduly delay. 
III. ESFs Rule 11 Motion Also Failed As A Matter Of Law Because It Was Not Filed 
To Remedy Any Alleged Harm Or Prejudice To ESI, But Was Filed For The 
Improper Purpose Of Obtaining A Final Disposition Of The Subject Claims 
Two additional rules also show the lack of merit of ESFs Rule 11 Motion as a matter 
of law. First, only misstatements or errors that cause harm or prejudice can result in 
sanctions. Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, f28, 15 P.3d 1021 ("rule 11 does not call for the 
imposition of sanctions whenever there are factual errors; the misstatements must be 
significant and sanctions will not be imposed when they are not critical and the surrounding 
circumstances indicate that counsel did conduct a reasonable inquiry." (citing 5A Charles 
7(...continued) 
Claims was a Rule 11 (b)( 1) violation can be decided as a matter of law, even though typically 
claims for Rule 11(b)(1) sanctions involve findings of fact that are reviewed for sufficiency 
of the evidence. See Gillmor, 2010 UT App 2 at % 19. 
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Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1335, at 67 
(1990)); K.F.K. v. T. W.9 2005 UT App 85, % 4,110 P.3d 162; Utah State Bar v. Sorensen, 910 
P.2d 1227, 1228 (Utah 1996) ("The misnomer of plaintiff in the original complaint was a 
technical error which did not cause appellants any prejudice . . . . " ) . 
Second, Rule 11 sanctions are a purely collateral issue and do not address the merits 
of a party's claim; the only issue is whether a claim, contention, allegation, defense or denial 
in a filing had sufficient legal or factual justification. Barton v. Utah Transit Authority, 872 
P.2d 1036,1040 (Utah 1994) ("[B]y their very nature, rule 11 sanctions are a collateral issue 
and do not address the merits of the party's cause of action."); see also Morse, 2000 UT 86 
at f 28 ('" [T]he fact that a complaint is dismissed for legal insufficiency or does not produce 
a triable issue does not necessarily mean that a sanction is appropriate.'" (citation omitted)). 
ESI did not file its Rule 11 Motion to remedy any alleged harm or prejudice to it.8 
ESI, with its Rule 11 Motion, only complained of having to defend against the concededly 
valid Subject Claims after April 2004.9 This is confirmed by the fact that the only sanctions 
8
 ESI did not challenge MYI's assertion in opposition to the ESFs Rule 11 Motion 
below that ESI was not claiming any prejudice or harm. (R. 4103-05 (Tab M).) 
9
 On appeal, ESI argues that, if it had known Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims 
earlier, it could have gotten Mr. Seely to stipulate to the dismissal of the Subject Claims 
earlier than it did. This is merely a variation of its ineffective argument that it should not 
have had to defend against the Subject Claims. Moreover, ESI may not argue on appeal Mr. 
Seely's eventual willingness to conditionally stipulate to the dismissal of the Subject Claims 
as grounds for Rule 11 sanctions because Mr. Seely had not stipulated to the dismissal of the 
Subject Claims as of the time ESI made its Rule 11 Motion. Also, Mr. Seely could not have 
stipulated to the dismissal of the Subject Claims before the April 10,2008 Ruling on Seely's 
Motion to Dismiss, as before that ruling he would have had no standing to make that 
stipulation. Lastly, the argument incorrectly assumes Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims 
(continued...) 
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it sought were dismissal with prejudice of the Amended Complaint and all of its attorneys' 
fees incurred below after April 2004. It is axiomatic that having to defend against valid 
claims for relief is not harm or prejudice. See, e.g., Sorensen, 910 P.2d at 1228 (affirming 
a determination that no Rule 11 violation had occurred where a plaintiff had filed a complaint 
asserting a position on which there was no Utah case law at the time of filing, even though 
the Utah Supreme Court decided a case that precluded plaintiffs position during the 
pendency of the litigation.) 
Instead of seeking Rule 11 sanctions in order to remedy any alleged harm or prejudice 
to it, ESI misused Rule 11 in order to obtain a final disposition of the Subject Claims in its 
favor based upon the purported merit of its claim that Mr. Seely and not MYI owned the 
Subject Claims after April 2004. This is demonstrated by the fact that ESI improperly 
sought, as Rule 11 sanctions, the dismissal of the Amended Complaint with prejudice, even 
though it did not claim the Amended Complaint had been filed in violation of Rule 11 
and even though ownership of the Subject Claims had no bearing on the merits of the Subject 
Claims. This also is demonstrated by the fact that ESI also improperly sought, as Rule 11 
sanctions, all of its post-April 2004 attorneys' fees, as if it was the prevailing party. 
Rule 11 does not allow for the "ultimate" sanction of dismissal of a pleading that was 
not filed in violation of Rule 11. U.R.C.P. 11(c)(2) ("A sanction imposed for violation of 
this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or 
9(... continued) 
and is a matter of pure speculation, given Mr. Seely's position that he did not own the 
Subject Claims. 
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comparable conduct by others similarly situation."); see also Feather stone v. Schaerrer, 2001 
UT 86, % 41, 34 P.3d 194, (stating, "under rule 11 the trial court is not required to assess 
costs and fees, but is allowed to award sanctions only to the extent necessary 'to deter 
repetition of [the inappropriate] conduct.' . . .") (emphasis and modification in original.) 
This is a necessary corollary of the rule that Rule 11 sanctions are an entirely collateral issue 
that do not address the merits of a party's claims for relief. See Barton, 872 P.2d at 1040. 
Final disposition of claims for relief under Rule 11 would be a violation of due process. See 
UtahDept ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d4,7 (Utah 1995) ("'The courts, in the interest 
of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing 
on the merits of every case.'" (quoting Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, Yll P.2d 189,190 
(Utah 1962) (emphasis in Osguthorpe))). 
ESFs misuse of Rule 11 to obtain a final disposition of the Subject Claims in its favor 
also is demonstrated by the fact that its Rule 11 Motion entirely turned on the merits of its 
claim that there had been ^pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims. ESI made the same 
claim as formal claims for relief in its Second Amended Counterclaim. (R. 3022-30.) A 
Rule 11 motion that turns on the merits of a claim necessarily is an improper Rule 11 motion 
because Rule 11 motions, by their nature, are collateral motions that do not concern the 
merits of any claim. See Barton, 872 P.2d at 1040; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, Corp., 496 
U.S. 384, 396, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2456 (1990). 
ESFs Rule 11 Motion manifestly was predicated upon ESI prevailing upon its claim 
that there had been & pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims. ESI made the Rule 11 
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Motion upon its theory that MYI had "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims under 
the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. ESI squarely admitted that its Rule 11 Motion turned 
on the merits of its claim that Mr. Seely, rather than MYI, owned the Subject Claims when 
ESI submitted its Rule 11 Motion for decision without filing a reply memorandum because, 
according to ESI, "claim ownership and Rule 25 issues were thoroughly briefed by the 
parties." (R. 4104-05 (Tab M at 2-3).) 
Below, ESI introduced into the case and vigorously pursued its claim that there had 
been a pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims, even though ownership of those claims 
had no bearing on MYFs right to prosecute, or the merits of, the claims. ESI then sought 
dismissal of the Subject Claims with prejudice as a Rule 11 sanction based upon that 
ownership claim. ESI did so on the alleged basis that MYFs opposition to ESFs ownership 
claim was without legal or factual justification, simply because, according to ESI, its 
ownership claim had merit. A significant portion of the attorneys fees that ESI sought as an 
additional sanction were incurred pursuing its ownership claim (based upon the number of 
its filings involving this issue), even though that claim had no relevance to the merits of, or 
MYFs right to prosecute, the Subject Claims. (R. 4014-17 at f 2.) ESFs Rule 11 Motion 
was properly denied as a matter of law. 
IV. Even Incorrectly Assuming There Had Been A Pendente Lite Transfer Of The 
Subject Claims And Ownership Of The Subject Claims Mattered, ESFs Rule 11 
Motion Still Would Fail As A Matter Of Law Because There Was A Legal And 
Factual Justification For MYI To Contest ESFs Claim That There Had Been A 
Pendente Lite Transfer 
A litigant and its counsel complies with Rule 11 if there is some factual and legal 
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justification for its litigation statements. Sorensen, 910 P.2d at 1228; Morse, 2000 UT 86 
at Tf 28 ("'Rule 11 places an affirmative duty on attorneys and litigants to make a reasonable 
investigation (under the circumstances) of the facts and the law before signing and 
submitting any pleading, motion, or other paper.'"); Robinson v. Morrow, 2004 UT App 285, 
f^ 24 n.3, 99 P.3d 341 (observing that Rule 11(b) "sets a relatively low standard requiring 
some factual basis after a reasonable inquiry5')). 
Under this rule, even if it is incorrectly assumed that there had been a pendente lite 
transfer of the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely and Rule 25(c) is ignored, ESFs mere assertion, 
first made in January 2007, of its claim that there had been a pendente lite transfer of the 
Subject Claims would not have put MYI or its counsel in retroactive or on-going violation 
of Rule 11 by continuing to prosecute the Subject Claims. ESI's claim was the subject of 
dispute and subsequent decision by the district court. Rule 11 did not require MYI to simply 
concede the alleged merits of ESI's claim if there was a legal and factual basis for MYI to 
contest the claim. There clearly was such a legal and factual justification for MYI to contest 
that claim. 
Mr. Seely's understanding (R. 3217a (Tab E at f 5) and Developers' understanding 
(R. 1431-32) that the Subject Claims had not been transferred under the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement alone provided a sufficient legal and factual justification for MYI to 
contest ESI's claim that there had been ^pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims. Those 
parties were the alleged transferees, so their intentions are controlling as a matter of law. See 
WebBankv. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,117,54 P.3d 1139. Mr. Seely 
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was the alleged final transferee with an interest in establishing as large a transfer as 
possible.10 
In addition, the language of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement provided a 
sufficient legal and factual justification for MYI to contest ESFs claim of & pendente lite 
transfer. See Ward, 907 P.2d at 268; Dairies, 2008 UT 51 at ffif 26-31. The March 2004 
Settlement Agreement did not expressly provide for the transfer of the Subject Claims. ESI 
does not even attempt to argue, much less show, on appeal that MYFs arguments in support 
of its appeal of the Order of Dismissal have no legal or factual justification so as to constitute 
a further Rule 11 violation. This completely undercuts ESFs claim that there was no legal 
or factual justification for MYI to contest ESFs claim of a pendente lite transfer of the 
Subject Claims. 
ESI argues that MYI cannot rely upon Mr. Seely's September 26, 2007 declaration, 
wherein Mr. Seely testified he did not understand he had received the Subject Claims, 
because that declaration came after MYI first contested ESFs claim that MYI had transferred 
the Subject Claims. However, ESI confuses the distinction between evidence and the record. 
MYI relied upon the evidence of Mr. Seely's understanding that the Subject Claims were 
10
 ESI argues that Mr. Seely's understanding that the Subject Claims were not 
transferred to him is insufficient legal or factual justification under Rule 11 because, if true, 
the Subject Claims allegedly still would have been transferred to Developers. This ignores 
Developers' understanding that it did not receive the Subject Claims. (R. 1431-32.) 
Moreover, if Mr. Seely did not own the Subject Claims under the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement, then neither did Developers. Under paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d) of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement, the only assets of MYI that were transferred were the "Indemnitors' 
Assets" and the only "Indemnitors' Assets" that were not transferred to Mr. Seely (and stayed 
with Developers) was the Black Ridge Drive Project and MYFs Black Ridge Drive Project 
Litigation. (R. 1676-77 (Tab A at 5-6, ffi[ 2(b), 2(d)).) 
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not transferred to him under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. Mr. Seely's declaration 
was merely a record of that evidence; the declaration established the separate fact that Mr. 
Seely had such an understanding. The date that evidence became part of the record does not 
alter the independent existence of Mr. Seely's understanding. Mr. Seely's understanding is 
what provided sufficient factual justification under Rule 11 for MYI to contest ESFs claim 
that there had been a pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims. Rule 11(b)(3) requires 
evidentiary support, which means evidence of existing facts, regardless of when the 
evidentiary record is created.11 
Moreover, ESI offered no evidence showing there was a Rule 11 violation. A 
violation of Rule 11(b)(3) or (4) is shown where there is evidence, independent of the 
allegedly false litigation position, that conclusively demonstrates that a factual allegation, 
statement or denial was false when made, and there also is evidence establishing that the 
litigant or counsel knew or reasonably should have known, at the time the litigation position 
was made, of the evidence that conclusively controverts the statement, allegation, or denial. 
Morse, 2000 UT 86 at HI 22, 29. In Morse, the Utah Supreme Court held that an attorney 
who had signed a verified complaint had violated Rule 11 by alleging in the complaint that 
the plaintiff had not been removed as an officer of a California corporation because of 
dishonesty. The court found the allegation was a Rule 11 violation on the basis that (1) an 
SEC filing by the corporation conclusively established that the plaintiff, in fact, had been 
11
 According to ESF s argument, parties could not rely upon testimony, gathered after 
their pleadings were filed, that proved facts existing at the time the pleadings were filed in 
order to factually justify the pleadings under Rule 11. 
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removed as a corporate officer because of dishonesty and (2) a previous filing by the attorney 
in another case conclusively established that the attorney had knowledge of that SEC filing. 
Id. Whether a party or counsel violates Rule 11(b) is a question of law. Id. at % 26. 
ESI fails to show that the Order Denying ESI's Rule 11 Motion was error, even 
incorrectly assuming there had been ^pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims and Rule 
259(c) is ignored, because ESI cites no evidence (and offered no evidence below), as 
necessary to show a Rule 11(b)(3) or (4) violation under Morse. ESI cites no evidence that 
(1) conclusively established, independent from the allegedly false litigation statements or 
positions, that MYI, in fact, had transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely under the March 
2004 Settlement Agreement, or (2) that conclusively established that MYI or its counsel 
knew or reasonably should have known, in April 2004 or thereafter, of such independent 
evidence: 
• ESI relied upon the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. This is the only 
evidence independent from any alleged false litigation position or statement upon which ESI 
relies. However, the March 2004 Settlement Agreement itself in no manner conclusively 
established that there had been & pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims. 
• ESI also relied upon Mr. Farley's April 12,2004 letter ESFs counsel, to which 
Mr. Farley attached Mr. Jensen's March 30, 2004 letter with its attachments, which stated 
that Developers "essentially owns [MYI], its assets, all accounts receivable, etc." (R. 3709-
52.) However, as shown in the Reply portion of this Brief, these letters did not address the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement or Mr. Seely's ownership of any asset of MYI, much less 
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the Subject Claims. As such, they do not show either that MYI, in fact, had transferred the 
Subject Claims to Mr. Seely or MYFs counsel's actual or constructive knowledge of such 
an alleged transfer. 
• ESI relied upon MYFs argument in its January 16, 2007 Plaintiffs Reply 
Memorandum to Defendants' Opposition to Motion, filed in support of MYFs Motion for 
Protective Order and to Quash, that it had the right to prosecute the Subject Claims under 
U.C.A. § 48-2c-1302(6), which authorizes a dissolved corporation to wind up its affairs by 
suing to collect on accounts receivable. (R. 3702.) This is argument, not independent 
evidence regarding the alleged pendente lite transfer of interest. Moreover, the argument did 
not even address ESFs claim that there had been a pendente lite transfer of interest; it 
addressed the fact that MYI had allowed its corporate registration to lapse. (R. 3660,3190 
at f 22.) The contention was warranted by existing law, as U.C.A. § 48-2c-1302(6) clearly 
allows a dissolved corporation to be a plaintiff in an action to collect on an account 
receivable. The argument became moot when MYI was reinstated. The contention was 
consistent with MYFs position that there had not been a,pendente lite transfer of interest. 
• ESI relied upon the statement in MYFs January 26, 2007 Memorandum In 
Opposition To Defendants' Rule 17(a) Objection that MYI had assigned all of its interests 
in the Black Ridge Drive Project and the Black Ridge Drive Project litigation "as well as all 
interest, rights, and title to MYFs assets." (R. 1312.) ESI ignores that, in the next paragraph 
in that brief, MYI stated that the Subject Claims were not included in the assets that had 
been transferred to Mr. Seely. (R. 1312 at % 6.) MYI stated in that brief: 
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In exchange for $150,000..., Developers assigned and transferred to Seely all 
interests, rights and title that Developers had acquired from MYI to certain 
projects and litigation matters (not including the MYI v ESI and Wal-
Mart litigation) and assigned, transferred and sent over to Seely all of MYPs 
assets with the exception of certain litigation matters (not including the case 
at bar). 
(R. 1316 at Tf 6.) The factual justification for that statement is discussed above. 
• ESI relied upon the deposition testimony of Merrick Young and his father, 
Alan Young. Alan testified that MYI generally had no assets when it was reinstated. (R. 
3661.) Merrick testified that MYI generally had transferred accounts receivable to Mr. Seely. 
(R. 3278.) ESI gives the testimony too much significance. Neither witness was asked 
whether MYI owned the Subject Claims or had transferred the Subject Claims under the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 3661, 3278.) Neither witness was asked whether 
he was considering that the Subject Claims were assets of MYI so as to be considered within 
the question being asked. (Id.) Merrick's testimony was qualified as he testified that 
accounts receivable had been transferred to Mr. Seely "in some form." There was no 
evidence establishing a foundation for Alan to testify as to an understanding of the March 
2004 Settlement Agreement. There was no foundation for either witness to testify as to the 
legal effect of that agreement. 
• ESI relied upon MYFs statement in its March 12, 2007 Plaintiffs 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Substitution that Mr. Seely generally had 
purchased assets of MYI from Developers and generally was the owner of assets of MYI. 
(R. 3850.) ESI ignores that MYI already was on record as asserting that only certain of 
MYFs assets had been transferred to Mr. Seely, which did not include the Subject Claims. 
(R. 1312.) Moreover, MYI' s argument in its opposition to ESF s motion for substitution was 
stated in the alternative; MYI argued it remained the valid plaintiff regardless of whether 
there had been pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims, This is made clear by the fact 
that MYI asserted in that opposition that "Defendants now assert that Mr. Seely is the owner 
of MYFs interest in this litigation" without conceding the truth of that assertion. (R. 3850.) 
Rule 25(c) provided the legal justification for that argument. 
• ESI relied upon MYFs response in its Reply to the Second Amended 
Counterclaim to argue that MYI was being "ambiguous" as to ownership of the Subject 
Claims. That Reply did not independently evidence either that there had been a pendente lite 
transfer of the Subject Claims or MYFs counsel actual or constructive knowledge of such 
an alleged transfer. MYI unambiguously denied ESFs allegations that MYI had 
transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely. (R. 3192 at % 32,3195 at % 52.) This denial 
was supported by evidence (specifically, Mr. Seely9s and MYFs understandings and the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement itself).12 
ESI fails to point to any evidence, independent from the alleged Rule 11 violation, that 
conclusively established that MYI, in fact, had transferred the Subject Claims. As such, ESI 
12
 ESI also pointed to MYFs responses in that Reply to ESFs allegations regarding 
the legal effect of Developer's execution order and the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. 
However, MYI properly admitted that those documents existed, and alleged that those 
documents spoke for themselves. (R. 3189-90 at ffif 21,24-25,3195 at f 51.) ESI also relied 
upon MYFs denials of ESFs allegations that there was a need to resolve the issue of who 
owned the Subject Claims. (R. 3196 at ffl[ 56-57.) This was not a denial of a factual 
contention and so did not come within the purview of Rule 11(b)(4). Moreover, those 
denials had a legal justification under Rule 25(c), which made post-April 2004 ownership of 
the Subject Claims of no relevance to the resolution of those claims. 
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necessarily fails to establish the actual or constructive knowledge of MYFs counsel of such 
evidence needed for ESI to show that the Order Denying ESFs Rule 11 Motion was error. 
ESI contended with its Rule 11 Motion that MYI had violated Rule 11 by not coming forth 
with evidence showing it continued to own the Subject Claims. (R. 3318-19 (Tab J at 19-20 
("Despite multiple opportunities for MYI and/or Seely to present documentary or testimonial 
evidence to the Court that the claims at issue are owned and/or otherwise controlled by MYI, 
such proof has not been made." (emphasis in original))).) However, it was ESI who was 
claiming there had been a pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims and so it was ESI who 
had the burden of proving that claim. That mere claim by ESI, which was not decided by the 
district court against MYI until the January 21, 2009 Ruling of Dismissal as to the Subject 
Claims, is not evidence that could have established that MYFs entire post-April 2004 
prosecution of the Subject Claims was a "continuing" Rule 11 violation. See Morse, 2000 
UT 86 at [^28 ("'[T]he fact that a complaint is dismissed for legal insufficiency or does not 
produce a triable issue does not necessarily mean that a sanction is appropriate.'" (citation 
omitted)). 
With its Rule 11 Motion, ESI merely contended that the particular arguments, 
statements and denials upon which it relied allegedly showed that MYFs entire post-April 
2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims was a "continuing" Rule 11 violation.13 (R. 3301, 
3318-19 (Tab J at 2,19-20).) However, on appeal, ESI now apparently claims that each or 
13
 ESI did not challenge MYFs assertion in opposition to the ESFs Rule 11 Motion 
below that ESI was not claiming any particular filing was a Rule 11 violation. (R. 4103-05 
(Tab M).) 
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any of those particular arguments, statements or denials separately were Rule 11 violations. 
ESI cannot challenge the denial of its Rule 11 Motion on the basis of an issue not raised by 
that motion, especially when this Court's review of issues raised for the first time on appeal 
is limited to circumstances that are not present here. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, f 
39, 86 P.3d 699 ("'[W]e will review issues raised for the first time on appeal only if 
exceptional circumstances or 'plain error' exists.'" (citation omitted).). Moreover, that claim 
is inconsistent with ESI's position that the various statements and arguments it relies upon 
allegedly proved that MYI allegedly had "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject Claims. As 
shown by Morse, such "proof must exist independently from the alleged Rule 11 violation. 
Morse, 2000 UT 86 at ffl[ 22, 29. Also, that claim would fail as a matter of law as 
demonstrated above in the discussion as to each particular action and by the fact that ESI 
inconsistently relies upon both instances where MYI allegedly revealed there had been a 
pendente lite transfer of interest and instances where MYI allegedly concealed there had been 
such a transfer. There was no harm to ESI, especially considering the first instance was an 
alleged revelation, Mr. Farley's April 12,2004 letter, which ESI received over two and a half 
years before ESI first claimed there had been a pendente lite transfer and over four years 
before ESI's Rule 11 Motion.14 
14
 To the extent ESI now claims Mr. Farley's April 12, 2004 letter, by which he 
forwarded Mr. Jensen's March 30 letter and its attachments to ESI's counsel, was a Rule 11 
violation, the claim fails. By the time Mr. Farley forwarded on Mr. Jensen's letter on April 
12, 2004, the March 2004 Settlement Agreement had been executed by Developers. 
However, there is no evidence that Mr. Farley knew this or should have known of either the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement, or that Developers had executed thai agreement, when 
he forwarded Mr. Jensen's letter. In any event, Mr. Farley's letter was not a court filing 
(continued...) 
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Without citing any independent evidence, ESI also merely assumes on appeal that 
each of the particular arguments, statements and denials upon which it bases its "continuing" 
Rule 11 claim were only to harass ESI and to cause unnecessary delay because there 
allegedly was no legal or factual justification for MYI to contest ESFs claim that there had 
been ^pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims. Given that there was a sufficient factual 
and legal justification for MYFs arguments, statements and denials, ESFs mere argument 
that these filings were for improper purposes in violation of Rule 11(b)(1) falls away as a 
matter of law. 
Lastly, a major theme of ESFs Rule 11 Motion, and ESFs appeal, is that MYI 
allegedly concealed from ESI that there allegedly had been a pendente lite transfer of the 
Subject Claims. For instance, ESI argues that MYI allegedly was not forthcoming in 
producing the March 2004 Settlement Agreement and that MYI tried to block ESI from 
deposing Mr. Seely. These arguments are misguided and inappropriate. They concern 
discovery/disclosure issues that do not fall within the purview of Rule 11. Rule 11 concerns 
false statements, allegations or denials, or contentions and allegations without any basis in 
the law, and not disclosure issues. U.R.C.P. 11(b). U.R.C.P. 37, not at issue here, concerns 
failures to make disclosures. Moreover, ESFs arguments that it can be assumed from these 
alleged concealments that MYI did not own the Subject Claims and was acting to harass and 
14(...continued) 
within Rule 1 Fs purview. ESI argues the letter fell under Rule 11 when it was attached to 
MYFs memoranda filed in opposition to ESFs motions to compel Mr. Seely's deposition, 
ESFs Rule 17 objection and ESFs Rule 25(c) motion. However, the letter was attached to 
demonstrate the ESFs receipt of the letter over two years earlier, such that ESI was on notice 
of the alleged ownership issue. This was not a false statement. 
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cause undue delay is without basis. All of MYFs litigation responses to ESFs vigorous 
prosecution of its irrelevant claim that there had been ^pendente lite transfer of the Subject 
Claims can all be explained on the basis that (1) MYI did not understand that it had 
transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely, (2) ownership of the Subject Claims was 
immaterial to whether MYI could continue to prosecute the Subject Claims, and (3) Merrick 
Young did not want his father-in-law, Mr. Seely, dragged into the lawsuit after Mr. Seely 
already had assisted MYI with its debts. In addition, ESFs arguments fail to address why it 
waited until January 2007, over two and a half years after it received Mr. Farley's April 12, 
2004 letter, before it so actively litigated the alleged ownership issue, if it thought that issue 
was dispositive. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ESI fails to demonstrate that the Order Denying ESFs Rule 
11 Motion was incorrectly decided. As such, that order should be affirmed. 
DATED: Apri$^, 2010. 
SAVAGE, YEATES & WALDRON, P.C. 
'E. Scon Savage 
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-50-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(b), I hereby certify that on this 
Z^2L~day of April, 2010,1 caused two true and correct copies of the within and foregoing 
to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Clark B. Fetzer 
Rinehart Fetzer Simonsen & Booth, P.C. 
1200 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kim Trout 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
ADDENDUM 
INDEX OF EXHIBITS 
Tab J 7/11/08 Defendant ESFs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions 
Against MYI And Its' Counsel of Record 
Tab K 6/13/08 letter from ESFs counsel to MYI's counsel of its notice to file 
Motion for Sanctions 
Tab L 8/7/08 Merrick Young Incorporated's And Its Counsel's Opposition To 
ESFs Motion for Sanctions Against MYI And Its Counsel Of Record 
Tab M 8/18/08 Request To Submit For Decision And Request For Hearing 
Tab N 5/21/07 Corrected Rulings on Pending Motions; Associated Orders 
Tab O 3/13/09 Amended Order Denying ESFs Motion For Sanctions Against MYI 
And Its Counsel Of Record 
Tab A 
"*( 
CLARK B. FETZER (USB 1069) 
RINEHART FETZER SEMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. 
1200 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phone: (801) 328-0266 ext. 103 
Fax: (801) 328-0269 
KIM J. TROUT (ISB 2468) 
VICKY J. ELKIN(ISB 5978) 
TROUT • JONES • GLEDHILL • FUHRMAN, P.A. 
225 N. 9* Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Phone (208) 331-1170 
Facsimile (208) 331-1529 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, a 




WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, a Delaware business trust; 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; THE AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Nebraska 
corporation; WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS 




MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AGAINST MYI AND 
ITS' COUNSEL OF RECORD 
Civil No. 010500909 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
ESI'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
ITS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST MYI AND ITS' COUNSEL OF RECORD -1/22 
28011111! PH 2:l»9 
Engineered Structures, Inc., ("ESI"), by and through its counsel of record, hereby submit 
this Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Sanctions, filed concurrently herewith. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since March 25, 2004, Merrick Young Incorporated (hereinafter "MYI") and its' 
counsel of record have repeatedly violated the provisions of Rule 11 by continuing in the 
prosecution of the above-entitled matter without a legal basis to do so. MYI has continued with 
such prosecution by (1) concealing/confusing the issue regarding ownership of the claim(s) at 
issue; (2) representing it is the real party in interest without a basis in law or fact; (3) improperly 
representing that it is authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1302(6) to wind up its affairs and 
sue to protect its assets; and (4) improperly representing that it is authorized under Rule 25(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to continue to prosecute the claim as the assignor of the 
claim(s) which have been alleged against ESI, Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Trust") and The American Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as 
"American Insurance") in the above-entitled litigation. The conduct of MYI and its' counsel of 
record is not only unreasonable under the circumstances but has caused unnecessary delay and a 
needless (and substantial) increase in the cost of the above-entitled litigation thereby warranting 
an award of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
RULE 11 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to court; 
sanctions. . . . (b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written 
motion, or other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting or later 
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advocating), an attorney . . . is certifying that to the best of the person's 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, (b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as 
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation; (b)(2) the claims . . . and other legal contentions therein are warranted 
by existing law . . .; (b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have 
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; . . . 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may . . . impose an 
appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated 
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
U.RX.P. 11. The text of Rule 11 is quite explicit that the district court may sanction the 
attorneys, law firms, or parties which have violated Rule 11 and/or are responsible for the 
violation. And, while Utah courts do not appear to have specifically addressed that portion of the 
rule providing for joint responsibility on the part of the law firm and/or its partners, members 
and/or employees, the Federal Advisory Committee Note on this topic is helpful1: 
[t]he Advisory Committee Note to the 1993 amendment specifically states that 
this provision [regarding the sanctioning of attorneys, law firms, or parties] is 
'designed to remove the restrictions of the former rule,' which had been 
interpreted in Pavelic [& LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 1989, 110 S. 
Ct 456, 493 U.S. 120] to prohibit the district court from sanctioning a law firm 
when an attorney from the firm signed the paper. The Advisory Committee Note 
to the 1993 amendment of Rule 11 further explains that 
[t]he sanction should be imposed on the persons - whether 
attorneys, law firms, or parties - who have violated the rule or who 
may be determined to be responsible for the violation. The person 
signing, filing, submitting, or advocating a document has a 
nondelegable responsibility to the court, and in most situations is 
the person to be sanctioned for a violation. Absent exceptional 
1
 The 1997 amendment to Rule 11 of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure conformed state Rule 11 with federal Rule 
11; therefore, where the Utah court has not examined a particular subpart of rule 11, guidance from authorities 
examining federal rule 11 may be sought. Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 865 \ 27, 15 P.3d 1021. And, while Utah 
courts are not bound by these authorities, "they are helpful to [the] understanding of the rule." Id, 
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circumstances, a law firm is to be held also responsible when * * * 
one of its partners, associates, or employees is determined to have 
violated the rule. * * * [I]t is appropriate that the law firm 
ordinarily be viewed as jointly responsible under established 
principles of agency. 
5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1333, 
pp, 523-524 (3d ed. 2004). Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a 
question of law. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 1997, 945 P.2d 180, 193. The trial court has 
great leeway to tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of the particular case. Id. at 195. 
Barton, supra at 1040, n. 6. 
Imposition of Rule 11 sanctions does not necessarily indicate that a complaint was filed 
without basis, but only that "the attorney has abused the judicial process." Barton v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 1994, 872 P.2d 1036, 1040 {citing Cooter v. Gell v. Harimarx Corp,, 496 U.S. 
384, 396, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2456 (1990)). Indeed, by their very nature, Rule 11 sanctions are a 
collateral issue and do not address the merits of the party's cause of action. Barton, supra, 
{citing Cooter at 395,110 S. Ct at 2455). The Barton Court further noted: 
It is proper for a trial court to enforce rule 11 sanctions after a plaintiff has 
voluntarily dismissed an action under rule 41(a). Cooter, 496 U.S. at 395, 110 S. 
Ct. at 2455. If a trial court could not do so, rule 11 sanctions would lose their 
bite. A sanctioned plaintiff could always voluntarily dismiss to avoid sanctions 
and then later refile a complaint with a clean slate. However, the violation of rule 
11 is complete when the party files the pleading, motion or other paper with the 
court, and a subsequent voluntary dismissal does not eradicate the rule 11 
violation. Id. Indeed, rule 11 affirmatively states that the trial court "shall 
impose" sanctions on a violator. Thus, once a trial court finds a violation, it must 
(1) impose sanctions and (2) be able to retain jurisdiction to enforce those 
sanctions. 
Barton, supra. 
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ARGUMENT AND RELEVANT BACKGROUND FACTS 
Since April, 2004, MYI and its' counsel of record have violated the provisions of Rule 11 
by filing papers and pleadings unsupported by fact and unwarranted in law. MYI, and its' 
counsels' conduct, is in clear violation of Rule 11 and has caused unnecessary delay and 
enormous increase in the cost of litigation of the above-entitled matter. By way of appropriate 
sanction, the claims against ESI, the Trust and American Insurance should be dismissed. 
Moreover, ESI should be awarded attorney's fees incurred since April, 2004 when MYI assigned 
all of its assets to Developers and lost the right to pursue the above-entitled litigation. A 
summary of relevant background facts, and the arguments supporting this appropriate sanction, 
follow. 
On or about June 22, 2000, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and ESI entered into a Construction 
Agreement between Owner and Contractor under which ESI would act as the general contractor 
for the construction of a Wal-Mart Super Store located at 625 West Telegraph Street in 
Washington City, Utah (the "Wal-Mart Project") on land owned by the Trust.2 On August 18, 
2000, ESI entered into a Subcontract Agreement, #00023-02200-SUB (the "ESI/MYI 
Subcontract") with MYI under which MYI promised to provide certain construction materials 
and excavation services in accordance with the plans and specifications for the Wal-Mart 
Project.3 
On December 4, 2000, less than four (4) months after entering into the ESI/MYI 
2
 See Second Am. Countered, \ 8; see also Merrick Young Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countered, f 8. 
3
 See Second Am, Countercl., f 9; see also Merrick Young Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl., f9. 
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Subcontract Agreement, MYI entered into certain bonding arrangements (hereinafter c<the 
Bonds") with Developers Surety and Indemnity Company (hereinafter "Developers").4 As part 
of the consideration for issuing the Bonds, Merrick Young (hereinafter individually referred to as 
"Merrick"), his wife Stephanie Young (hereinafter individually referred to as "Stephanie") and 
MYI (Merrick, Stephanie and MYI will hereinafter be collectively referred to as "the 
Indemnitors") executed an Indemnity Agreement which, among other things, granted Developers 
a security interest in MYTs assets, including: 
any and all sums due or to become due on all other contracts, covenants and 
agreements whether bonded or unbonded, in which the Principal [MYI] or 
Indemnitor [Merrick and Stephanie, individually] has any interest, together with 
any notes, accounts receivable or chose in action related thereto.[5] 
On or about June 5, 2001, MYI filed an Amended Complaint in the instant case alleging 
four (4) causes of action against Defendants Trust, American Insurance and ESI.6 Each claim 
was based upon monies allegedly due and owing pursuant to the ESI/MYI Subcontract 
(hereinafter referred to as "the alleged ESI account receivable"). ESI does not dispute that at the 
time of the initial filing of the Amended Complaint, MYI owned the alleged ESI account 
receivable; however, MYI would soon lose all of its' assets to Developers - including the alleged 
ESI account receivable and the right to continue to prosecute the above-entitled action. 
In or about November, 2002, after receiving numerous claims against the Bonds from 
4
 See Second Am. CountercL, \ 17; see also Merrick Young Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl., f 17; see also 
Affidavit of Kim J, Trout, filed concurrently herewith, Ex. A, Rule 11 Notice Letter (hereinafter "Trout Aff., Ex. 
A"), Attach. 1. 
5
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 1 (Indemnity Agreement). 
6
 Count One alleged Breach of Contract against ESI. Count Two alleged Mechanic's Lien and Foreclosure against 
the Trust. Count Three alleged a claim against American Insurance and ESI on ESTs payment bond. Count Four 
alleged Unjust Enrichment against both the Trust and ESI. See Am. Compl. 
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suppliers and subcontractors of MYI, Developers sued MYI, Merrick, and Stephanie in the Fifth 
District Court, Washington County, State of Utah, Civil Case No. 02-0502319 (hereinafter 
"Developers Litigation"). On or about March 18, 2003, an Order for Prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment/Garnishment; Preliminary Injunction Freezing Assets; and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was entered which, inter alia, allowed Developers to execute, attach and 
garnish on the accounts receivable, assets, interests, money, stocks, memberships, bonds, real 
property and personal property in which the Indemnitors had an interest.7 
Shortly thereafter, MYI was mvoluntarily administratively dissolved. This action was 
consistent with the dictates of the March 18, 2003 Order which restrained, enjoined and 
prevented MYI from selling, transferring, disposing, distributing, pledging, or encumbering any 
asset or real or personal property pending further order of the Court.8 
In the fall of 2003, Developers began negotiating an assignment, release and sale of the 
Indemnitors5 assets with MYI, Merrick, Stephanie, and Clyde G. Seely.9 On March 25, 2004, 
the Indemnitors and Seely signed a document titled Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and 
Assignment whereby the Indemnitors assigned "any and all interests, rights and title to 
Indemnitors' assets" to Developers and Developers sold certain assets to Seely in exchange for 
$150,000. The assets sold to Seely included the alleged ESI account receivable.I0 Developers 
7
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 2 (March 18,2003 Order (with Exhibits)). 
8
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 2 (March 18, 2003 Order (with Exhibits)). 
9
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach 13 (PL's Reply Mem. to Defs.' Opp. to Mot.) at Ex. H (Bates Nos. Plaintiff MYI 
11.10.05 02701 - 02721 (reflecting draft agreements with a facsimile stamp dated November, 2003). 
10
 The only assets excepted from the Developers/Seely sale were specifically identified on page 6 of the document 
in Paragraph 2.d)(ii) as "the Black Ridge Drive Project, the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation, and 
Developers Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation." See Second Am. Countered Ex. 3 (fully executed Settlement 
Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment). 
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signed the Settlement Agreement on April 5, 2004. 
On March 22, 2004 - three (3) days before the Indemnitors and Seely signed the 
Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment - Robert Jensen, MYFs original counsel 
of record, attempted to withdraw as counsel of record in the instant litigation.11 At this point in 
time, ESI was unaware of the Developers' Litigation, the assignment and sale of the 
Indemnitors' assets, and the administrative dissolution of MYL See Affidavit of Kim J, Trout, 
filed concurrently herewith (hereinafter "Trout Aff.") at f 6; See Affidavit of Thomas D. Hill, 
filed concurrently herewith (hereinafter "Hill Aff.") at ^  4. 
On March 30, 2004 - five days after the Indemnitors and Seely had signed the 
Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment but approximately one (1) week before 
Developers signed off on the deal - Robert Jensen advised Dennis Farley that "MYI is controlled 
and essentially owned" by the Bond Company." Mr. Jensen's letter further informed Mr. Farley 
that the Bond Company owned the assets of MYI, including all accounts receivable, etc., and the 
assets of Merrick Young individually and his wife individually.12 
On April 5, 2004, Developers signed the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and 
Assignment thereby effectuating the transfer of ownership of the claims against ESI to Mr. 
Seely.13 Although the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment was fully 
executed on April 5, 2004, neither ESI nor this Court were specifically advised of the 
11
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 3 (Withdrawal of Counsel). 
12
 See Trout Aff, Ex. A, Attach. 4 (March 30,2004 Letter). 
13
 See Second Am. CountercL, Ex. 3 (fully executed Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and A ssignment); see 
also Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. CountercL, f 24 (acknowledging the Settlement Agreement, 
Mutual Release, and Assignment was entered into by Developers, Seely and the Indemnitors). 
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transaction. Seventeen (17) months later, MYI produced unexecuted copies of the document in a 
production of documents exceeding 3,500 pages.14 
On April 12, 2004, Dennis Farley sent a letter to Clark Fetzer (Utah counsel for 
defendants) and Michael Leavitt (counsel for Western Rock Products and White Hills) attaching 
the March 30, 2004 letter from Jensen and stating: 
Re: Merrick Young Incorporated Financial Standing 
Gentlemen: 
Enclosed is a letter dated March 30, 2004, from Robert M. Jensen with 
attachments advising that Merrick Young Incorporated is controlled and 
essentially owned by its Bond Company. The Bond Company owns the assets of 
Merrick Young, Incorporated, including all accounts receivable, etc., and the 
assets of Merrick Young individually and his wife individually. [15] 
At the time the April 12, 2004 letter was sent, Mr. Farley's representation was absolutely false 
as, by this date, Mr. Seely owned some of MYPs assets - including the alleged ESI account 
receivable.16 MYI and its counsel of record clearly had either actual or constructive knowledge 
of this fact. Nevertheless, MYI did not alert the Court or counsel. Moreover, as noted supra, 
MYI did not even produce the unexecuted copy of Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and 
Assignment until sometime after November 10, 2005 - over one and one-half (V/z) years after 
the document was executed. 
Despite the dissolution of MYI and the loss of any and all interest, rights and title to 
MYI assets; on or about April 14,2004, Dennis Farley filed a Substitution of Counsel and Notice 
14
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 5 (produced copies of Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release and Assignment). 
15
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 6 (April 12,2004 Letter). 
16
 Compare Second Am. Countered Ex. 3 (fully executed Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment) 
with Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach 6 (April 12,2004 Letter). 
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of Substitution of Counsel. The documents were signed by Robert Jensen on March 31, 2004 
and March 16, 2004, respectively, and by Mr. Farley on April 6, 2004. It is not clear why Mr, 
Farley waited an additional week to file these documents. However, it is clear that, at the time 
these documents were signed and filed, Mr. Farley knew or should have known that MYI no 
longer owned the alleged ESI account receivable that served as the basis for the claims against 
ESI, the Trust and American Insurance in the underlying litigation.17 
On or about September 29, 2004, Alan Young "reorganized" and reinstated MYI and, in 
so doing, assigned himself 90,000 shares of stock thereby malcing himself a majority owner of 
MYI.18 ESI first learned of MYT's reorganization and reinstatement during Alan Young's 
deposition in November, 2005 at which time Alan testified (1) that he did not pay anyone for his 
shares of stock in MYI;19 (2) that the remaining shares of stock are owned by Merrick Young;20 
and (3) that at the time of reinstatement, MYI had no assets.21 Despite his purported role in 
reorganizing and reinstating MYI and his purported status as the majority shareholder in the 
company, Alan Young was not completely forthcoming about MYI's corporate structure. 
Although identified in the corporate reinstatement documents as "President" of MYI, Alan 
Young acted evasively during his deposition - refusing to respond to the question of the identity 
of MYI's President.22 This testimony seemed particularly unusual as, the day before, Merrick 
17
 See Trout Aff, Ex. A, Attach. 7 (Substitution of Counsel, Notice of Substitution of Counsel and Excerpt from 
Docket Sheet). 
18
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 8 (Application for Reinstatement and related documents); see also id, Attach 9 
(Excerpts from the Deposition of Alan Young), p. 14, li. 7 - p. 15, li. 11. 
19
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 9 (Excerpts from the Deposition of Alan Young, p. 15, li. 12 - p. 16, li. 12). 
20
 See id 
21
 Id, p. 16,11.16-21. 
22
 jtf,p. i73,li., 8 - p . 176,114. 
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Young had testified that he was the President of MYI and had been since "about 1994". 
Merrick went on to testify that in 2002 - the same year the Developers Litigation was 
initiated and a few months before Merrick Young allowed MYI to administratively dissolve in 
March, 2003 - Alan Young started Sunland Corporation because "I was no longer going to be in 
business."24 
Regardless of whether Alan Young or Merrick Young was the acting President of MYI 
following its reinstatement in September, 2004, there is no dispute that MYI actively continued 
to prosecute the claims against ESI, the Trust and American Insurance by filing in excess of 10 
motions (including a dispositive motion), opposing each motion filed by ESI, issuing new 
discovery requests, conducting discovery depositions (including the issuance of over 10 
subpoenas), issuing expert witness reports, and supplementing initial disclosures. However, 
MYI's deceptive conduct did not end with its continued prosecution of a claim which it did not 
own or its' continued concealment and obfuscation of facts. In the fall of 2005, MYI's counsel 
was forced to supplement discovery responses and acknowledge that Alan Young had altered 
evidence which had been produced to ESI during discovery.25 MYI also refused to adequately 
produce damage information and was ultimately sanctioned by the Court for its behavior.26 To 
date, MYI has never paid ESI the $11,397.62 which was awarded by the Court in November, 
23
 See Trout Af£, Ex. A, Attach. 10 (Excerpts from the Deposition of Merrick Young), p. 5,11. 18-24. 
24
 Id,p. 124,11.25-p. 125, li. 14. 
25
 See Trout Af£, Ex. A, Attach. 11 (September 6, 2005 Letter). 
26
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 12 (October 16,2006 Summary Rulings and Order). 
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2006. 
The transfer of the ownership interest of MYFs claim against ESI fully came to light 
during the continued deposition of Merrick Young on or about January 9, 2007. Thereafter, ESI 
sought to resolve the question while counsel for MYI fought to prevent such discovery and took 
affirmative steps to conceal and confuse the issue. For example, when ESI sought to take the 
deposition of Clyde G. Seely, MYI moved for a protective order and to quash the subpoena. In 
addition, in response to ESPs Opposition to MYI's Motion to Quash, MYI claimed "Merrick 
Young, Inc. [to be] the real party in interest."28 By way of justification for this statement, MYI 
and its counsel of record argued: 
Utah Code Annot. § 48-2c-1302(6) authorizes a dissolved company to wind up its 
affairs and has the same power as a company to sue to collect amounts owed to 
the company and to recover property or rights belonging to the company. It is 
unknown whether Merrick Young, Inc. will have any assets to convey to any 
party under the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment, that 
determination must await the winding up of Merrick Young, Inc. as authorized by 
law.[29] 
However, when these arguments were made, MYI and its' counsel of record knew, or 
should have known, that these arguments were not warranted by the evidence or existing law and 
were fiivolous/irrelevant. First, MYI was not a dissolved company. While MYI had been 
administratively dissolved on March 30, 2003; Alan Young, with or without the requisite 
corporate authority, reinstated the corporation on September 29, 2004. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10a-1422, because the reinstatement occurred within two (2) years of the dissolution, 
27
 ESI recognizes that Rule 11 Sanctions are not applicable to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, 
objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37. See U.R.C.P. 11(d). 
28
 See Trout Aff, Ex. A, Attach. 13 (PL's Reply Mem. to Defs.' Opp. to Mot. (with Exhibits referenced therein)). 
29
 See id. Attach. 13 at p. 3. 
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the administrative dissolution was revoked and the company was permitted to resume activity as 
if no dissolution had occurred. Therefore, contrary to MYI's/Mr. Farley's/Mr. Savage's 
argument in Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to Defendants5 Opposition to Motion, Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-2c-l302(6) was irrelevant to the litigation and ESFs claim that MYI may not be the 
real party in interest. 
In addition, MYI's (and/or Mr. Farley's and Mr. Savage's) claim that no assets had yet 
been conveyed under the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment was 
absolutely untrue when made. Not only had Mr. Farley been advised by Developers that MYI 
had no assets but MYI was certainly aware of the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and 
Assignment, and, consistent with his testimony, Alan Young had knowledge that MYI had no 
assets when he reinstated the company. Given the lack of evidentiary support and lack of legal 
basis, the arguments made by MYI and its' counsel of record were clearly presented for an 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
cost of the litigation. 
When ESI filed a supplemental rebuttal memorandum to clarify the record as to the 
speciousness, deceptiveness and obvious inaccuracy of MYFs arguments, MYI moved to strike 
ESFs pleading.30 MYFs pleadings, and claims asserted therein, continued to become 
progressively more evasive/deceptive: 
a. In response to ESFs Rule 17(a) Objection, MYI asserted that ESI should 
have been aware of the ownership of the claim because MYI dutifully transmitted all 
30
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 14 (PL's Mot. to Strike Defe.' Supp. Mem. in Opp. to Mot. to Quash). 
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documents regarding the Developers Litigation. However, MYI (and/or its counsel) also 
argued that Developers did not acquire the claims which were the subject of the instant 
litigation and, therefore, those assets were not transferred to Seely.31 
b. Shortly thereafter, and in stark contract to earlier argument advanced by 
MYI regarding the ownership of its assets, in Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Substitution, MYI (and/or its counsel) further confused the issue by stating 
"Clyde Seely ("Seely") is the present owner of MYI assets pursuant to the Settlement 
Agreement executed by MYI on March 25, 2004"32 but argued substitution was improper 
because there was no express provision in the Settlement Agreement "authorizing Seely 
to substitute himself as a plaintiff in the present litigation or to prosecute, compromise, 
dismiss, or otherwise dispose of the current lawsuit"33 and because ESI "knew5'34 that 
MYPs assets had been attached by Developers no later than April, 2004 and "acquired" 
by Seely no later than November, 2005.35 However, despite MYPs claims to the 
contrary, Seely's ownership of MYTs assets, including the alleged ESI account 
receivable which served as the basis for the claims against ESI, the Trust and American 
31
 See Trout Aff, Ex. A, Attach. 15 (Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Rule 17(a) Obj.) 
32




 As has been explained, supra, Mr. Farley's April 12, 2004 letter was not even factually accurate. Seely owned 
the claims at the time MYI and its' counsel of record transmitted the April 12, 2004 correspondence to ESI's 
counsel of record. Moreover, MYI never provided an executed copy of the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, 
and Assignment MYI produced two (2) unexecuted copies of the document (along with three unexecuted drafts of 
the November, 2003 "draft" version of the Settlement Agreement) along with a production of no less than 3,500 
pieces of paper. At no time did MYI advise ESI that the transaction which served as a basis for the Settlement 
Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment had occurred and/or that the final agreement (though not fully 
executed) along with various drafts had been produced. See Trout Aff. at ^  7. 
35
 Id at p. 10. 
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Insurance in the case at bar, authorized Seely to "prosecute, compromise, dismiss or 
otherwise dispose of the current lawsuit." MYI does not own the claim nor does MYI 
have any right or interest in the claim. Absent an agreement between MYI and Seely, 
MYI is not entitled to any recovery had against ESI as a result of the claims. 
On March 12, 2007, this Court found that "Seely has a clear personal interest in the 
subject matter of this action and in its outcome" and joined Seely as an additional plaintiff. ESI 
was given the opportunity to serve Seely with appropriate pleadings and Mr. Seely was given the 
time prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to respond to those pleadings.36 
On July 10, 2007, MYI was, again, administratively dissolved after its corporate officers 
failed to file a renewal.37 
ESI filed its Second Amended Counterclaim in August, 2007. On or about August 28, 
2007, counsel for ESI learned that Mr. Farley had retired and left this case in the hands of Jon 
Lear and Scott Savage.38 The reafter, on or about September 7, 2007, Mr. Savage filed a 
response to ESFs Second Amended Counterclaim. In that Answer, MYI was again ambiguous 
with respect to the ownership of the claims answering as follows: 
a. MYI admitted the entry of the March 18, 2003 Order in the Developers 
Litigation, but asserted the document "speaks for itself in response to the allegations that 
(i) Developers was given the right to execute, attach and garnish on the accounts 
receivable, assets, interests, money, stocks, memberships, bonds, real property and 
36
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 17 (Corrected Rulings on Pending Motions; Associated Orders). 
37
 See Trout Aff, Ex. A, Attach. 18 (Business Entity Search Results). 
38
 See Trout Aff. at 18. 
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personal property in which the Indemnitors had an interest; and (ii) an injunction was 
issued against the Indemnitors which precluded them from disbursing funds or conveying 
39 
any assets. 
b. Despite having produced draft documents of Release and Assignment 
Agreements, Settlement Agreements and Purchase Agreements and having discussed 
those documents in its pleadings, MYI denied having knowledge of the negotiations of 
the release and sale of its' assets, and the assets of the other Indemnitors.40 
c. MYI admitted entering into the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, 
and Assignment, but asserted the document "speaks for itself in response to the 
allegation that the Indemnitors assigned all their Assets to Developers and Developers 
sold certain Assets to Seely in exchange for $150,000.41 However, MYI then 
inconsistently denied having real or constructive knowledge of the transfer of MYFs 
Assets and subsequent sale of MYFs Assets since March 25, 2004.42 In addition, MYI 
denied that the claims alleged in the instant litigation against ESI and the other 
defendants were acquired by Developers and sold to Seely.43 This present denial is 
particularly troublesome given MYFs previous admissions that "Clyde Seely ('Seely') is 
the present owner of MYI assets pursuant to the Settlement Agreement executed by MYI 
39
 See Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl. at f^ f 21, 50. 
40
 See Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl. at f 23; see also Trout Aff, Ex A, Attach. 13 (PL's 
Reply Mem. to Defs.' Opp. to Mot. at Ex. H (Bates Plaintiff MYI 11 10.05 02699 - 02721)). 
41
 See Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl. at ^ 24, 51. 
42
 Id atK34. 
43
 Wat If 52. 
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on March 12, 2004,44 and Mr, Farley's letter dated April, 2004 whereby he states "[t]he 
Bond Company owns the assets of Merrick Young Incorporated, including all accounts 
receivable, etc., and the assets of Merrick Young individually and his wife 
individually."45. 
c. MYI denied the existence of a controversy concerning the ownership of 
the claim, real party in interest and rights/duties and obligations, if any, of Seely to 
prosecute the instant action. MYI further denied that a judicial determination is 
necessary and appropriate to decide these issues.46 Contrary to MYI's former answer that 
the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment "speaks for itself with 
respect to the ownership of the claims at issue, MYI denied that ESI is entitled to a 
declaration that Seely owns all right, title and interest in the claims.47 
d. MYI denied that it had no "right, title or interest in the Claims and is not, 
therefore, the real party in interest."48 
e. Despite the contrary testimony of Alan Young, MYPs reinstator and one 
of its' purported Presidents, MYI denied that at the time of reinstatement MYI had no 
assets.49 MYI further denied that it lacked the capacity or standing to sue ESI in the 
instant litigation and, in fact, affirmatively stated that certain actions (i.e., administrative 
44
 See Trout Aff, Ex. A, Attach. 16 (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Substitution) at p. 3, % 1. 
45
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 6 (April 12,2004 Letter). 
46
 See Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl. at ffl 55, 56, 60, 63,64,70,71. 
47
 See Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl at 157. 
48
 See Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl. at % 59. 
49
 See Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl. at *f 32. 
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dissolution, loss of its assets, Alan Young's reinstatement of company) did not affect 
MYI's standing or capacity to sue.50 
f. Finally, MYI denied that Seely acquired the claims from Developers and 
either refused to respond or categorically denied that Seely willfully, deliberately and 
fraudulently allowed MYI to pursue the litigation.51 
On April 10, 2008, this Court entered its Ruling on Clyde G. Seely's Motion to Dismiss 
Second Amended Counterclaim. In denying Seely's Motion to Dismiss, the Court made the 
following specific findings: 
According to the evidence currently available to this Court, the facts appeal' to be 
as follows: The claims made in this case by MYI constituted a chose in action 
which was an asset of MYI. That chose in action was attached by Developers in 
its lawsuit against MYI and its principals, and it was transferred to Mr. Seely in 
accordance with the 'Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment' 
signed by Mr. Seely in 2004. This litigation continued thereafter, with MYI 
continuing to prosecute the case in its own name, in spite of the transfer of its 
assets to Developers and then to Mr. Seely. 
Regardless of whether Mr. Seely covertly controlled the prosecution in this action 
after 2004 or he deliberately or negligently allowed MYI to continue to control it, 
Mr. Seely had the right to control MYI's claims in this case. The specification of 
certain lawsuits transferred to Mr. Seely in the 'Settlement Agreement, Mutual 
Release, and Assignment' does not obviate the general Language therein which 
also gave Mr. Seely "[a]ny equity in any other . . . asset in which any Indemnitor 
has an interest" and "[a]ny . . . other assets of any Indemnitor." The chose in 
action upon which MYI sued the defendants in this case is one such asset, and Mr. 
Seely owns it. [52] 
50
 See Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl. at f f 22,26,28, 29-31. 
51
 See Merrick Young, Inc.'s Reply to Second Am. Countercl. at *|f f 52, 73. ^n response to the allegations specific to 
the claims for relief against Mr. Seely, MYI stated: "MYI does not respond to the allegations in remaining 
paragraphs 73 - 95 of ESI's Second Amended Counterclaim, because the Claims for Relief and allegations therein 
are directed against Clyde G. Seely and not MYL To the extent any of these allegations is directed at MYI, MYI 
denies the same." 
52
 See Trout Aff., Ex. A, Attach. 19 (Ruling on Clyde G. Seely's Mot. to Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim). 
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On or about April 25, 2008, Clyde G. Seely filed his Answer to ESI's Second Amended 
Counterclaim. Therein, Mr. Seely denied being aware of MYFs prosecution of the instant 
litigation in its' own name and further denied consenting to such prosecution/representation. Mr. 
Seely also affirmatively disavowed any right or interest in the litigation.53 
MYI has not, to date, amended its Answer to ESI's Second Amended Counterclaim and 
despite the clear law of the case continues to claim an ownership in the claims against ESI. 
On June 13, 2008, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ESI 
delivered to MYI's counsel of record a Notice of Intent to Request Sanctions Pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. 11, along with a copy of this Motion. Therein, MYI and its counsel of record were 
advised of the factual basis of this motion along with ESI's arguments in support 
ESI has expended in excess of $800,000 in attorney's fees in this case since April, 2004 
when MYI lost and/or otherwise assigned its' assets to Developers and, therefore, lost the right 
to continue the prosecution of the instant case. See Hill Aff., f 11. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite multiple opportunities for MYI and/or Seely to present documentary or 
testimonial evidence to the Court that the claims at issue are owned and/or otherwise controlled 
by MYI, such proof has not been made. MYI's continued assertion that it is a proper plaintiff 
and/or that it owns the claims against ESI, the Trust and American Insurance are not warranted 
by existing law and the allegations/arguments that have been made in support of such claim(s) 
53
 See [Seely] Ans. to Second Am. Countercl., flf 36, 54. 
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have absolutely no evidentiary or legal support. Based on the foregoing, ESI can only conclude 
that MYI's prosecution of this claim after it assigned the alleged ESI account receivable asset to 
Developers in April 2004 was for the express purpose of harassing ESI and/or to cause 
unnecessary delay in the resolution of the matter or needless (and substantial) increase in the cost 
of litigation. 
The attorneys handling this lawsuit knew or should have known of the loss of MYTs 
assets, knew or should have known of the assignment of MYI's assets (including the alleged ESI 
account receivable), knew or should have known of the sale from Developers to Seely, knew or 
should have known of the lack of any subsequent assignment by Seely to MYI of the claims in 
the underlying litigation, and knew or should have known that the continued prosecution by MYI 
(which had been suspiciously reinstated by Alan Young after Merrick allowed the business to 
administratively dissolve and moved to Montana) was improper and unwarranted by existing 
law. Seely has taken no interest in pursuing the claim(s) filed against ESI by MYI. MYI's 
continued prosecution is, therefore, improper and violative of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. MYI and its' attorneys of record are responsible for ESI having incurred hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in rebutting these clearly baseless and/or fraudulent arguments. There can 
be no dispute that the pleadings that MYI and its' counsel of record have filed, and continue to 
file, are in clear violation of Rule 11. 
ESI respectfully requests that this Court sanction MYI and its' counsel of record jointly 
by dismissing the Amended Complaint of MYI and awarding ESI its' fees and costs incurred 
since April, 2004 when MYI and its' counsel chose to pursue and prosecute a claim it no longer 
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owned and proceeded to repeatedly violate Rule 11 by filing pleadings, motions and other papers 
which were presented for an improper purposes, contained claims, defenses and legal 
contentions which were not warranted by existing law, contained allegations and other factual 
contentions that lacked evidentiary support, contained unreasonable denials which were not 
warranted on the evidence and/or were filed without inquiry which would be deemed reasonable 
under the circumstances which exist in this case, 
DATED this /3/^day of June, 2008. 
RlNEHART FETZER SlMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. 
Clark B. Fetzer 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 13, 2008,1 caused to be sent, via hand-delivery, a true and 
correct copy of ESI'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS' MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS AGAINST MYI AND ITS5 COUNSEL OF RECORD to the parties listed 
below: 
Jon M. Lear 
Dennis C. Farley 
LEAR & LEAR 
The Downey Mansion 
808 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorneys for MYI 
Michael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Clyde G. Seely 
E. Scott Savage 
HERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
170 S. Main Street, Ste 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for MYI 
i tii Dated this 13U1 day of June, 2008. 
Lisa A. Hilden 
Legal Assistant 
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CLARK B. FETZER (USB 1069) 
RINEHART FETZER SIMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. 
1200 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phone: (801) 328-0266 ext. 103 
Fax: (801) 328-0269 
KIM J. TROUT (ISB 2468) 
VICKY J. ELKIN(ISB 5978) 
TROUT • JONES • GLEDHILL • FUHRMAN, P.A. 
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Phone (208)331-1170 
Facsimile (208) 331-1529 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, a 




WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, a Delaware business trust; 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; THE AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Nebraska 
corporation; WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and 
DOES 1-100, 
Defendants. 
ESI'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AGAINST MYI 
AND ITS' COUNSEL OF RECORD 
Civil No. 010500909 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
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COMES NOW Engineered Structures, Inc., ("EST'), by and through its counsel of 
record, and moves for Rule 11 Sanctions against MYI and its5 counsel for the filing of pleadings 
for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation, for asserting claims, defenses and other legal contentions that are 
unwarranted by existing law, and for pursuing litigation as the real party in interest without a 
legal basis for doing so. 
Notice of this Motion was served upon all parties, including MYI and its' Counsel of 
Record, on June 13,2008. 
This Motion is supported by the Affidavits of Kim J. Trout and Thomas D. Hill and a 
Memorandum, all filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2008. 
RlNEHART FETZER SlMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. 
Clark B.Fetzer 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 13, 2008,1 caused to be sent, via hand-delivery, a true and 
correct copy of ESPS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST MYI AND ITS5 COUNSEL 
OF RECORD to the parties listed below: 
Jon M. Lear 
Dennis C. Farley 
LEAR & LEAR 
The Downey Mansion 
808 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorneys for MYI 
Michael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Clyde G. Seely 
E. Scott Savage 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
170 S. Main Street, Ste 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for MYI 
Dated this 13th day of June, 2008. 
tp^ 
Lisa A. Hilden 
Legal Assistant 
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TROUT • TONES • GLEDHLLL • FUHRMAN, P A 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
Kim J. Trout 
Vicky J. Eika 
June 13,2008 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL 
Jon Lear and/or Managing Partner 
LEAR & LEAR 
Attorneys at Law 
299 South Main, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake Gty, UT 84111 
E. Scott Savage and Stephen & Waldron 
170 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake Gty, UT 84101 
Re: Merrick Young Incorporated v. ESI et aL 
Gvil Case No. 010500909 
Dear Mr. Lear and/or Managing Partner of Lear & Lear, Mr. Savage and Mr. Waldron: 
It is with great reluctance that ESI and its' counsel send this letter. Howeyer, the 
conduct engaged in by the counsel of record in this case and your client, Merrick Young, 
Inc. ("MYI"), have caused such unnecessary and needless expense to ESI that it believes that 
no alternatives presently exist. 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this letter serves as 
official notice of ESPs intent to seek sanctions against MYI and its counsel of record, 
jointly, for prosecuting a claim in violation of that rule. 
Following the expiration of twenty-one (21) days, ESI will be filing the enclosed 
Motion for Sanctions based upon the pleadings and orders in the above-entitled matter 
which specifically set forth, inter alia, the following: 
The 9& &Ickho Center • 225 North 9* Street Suite 820 
I1 O. BOA i :9" 4> Buue, Idaliu S3"*C1 
Phone (208j 331-1170 • Facsimile (208) 33M529 
FmaJ knoutf? icfaNv> cnm \eJkin^.id\!<i^_com 
- - - u 
Notice of Intent to Request Sanction Pursuant to U.R.GP. 11 
Jon Lear and/or Managing Partner 
E. Scott Savage and Stephen & Waldron 
June 13, 2008 
Page 2 
1. On December 4, 2000, MYI entered into a bonding arrangement with 
Developers Surety and Indemnity Company which, among other diings, included an 
Indemnity Agreement in which MYI granted Developers a security interest in the 
assets of Merrick Young and Stephanie Young, individually, and MYPs assets, 
including: 
any and all sums due or to become due on all other contracts, 
covenants and agreements whether bonded or unbonded, in which 
the Principal [MYI] or Indemnitor [Merrick Young and Stephanie 
Young, individually] has any interest, together with any notes, 
accounts receivable or chose in action related thereto. 
See Attachment 1, Indemnity Agreement 
2. On or about November, 2002, Developers sued MYI, Merrick Young 
and his wife, Stephanie Young (hereinafter referred to as "Developers Litigation"). 
3. On March 18, 2003, Developers received Judgment against MYI, 
Merrick Young and Stephanie Young (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the 
Indemnitors"), and an injuncdon against the Indemnitors from disbursing funds or 
conveying any assets, and garnishments. In the Developers Litigation, Judgment was 
entered allowing Developers to attach the assets of the Indemnitors, which included 
specific funds and claims as well as ie[z]ny equity in any other . . . asset in which any 
Indemnitor has an interest" and "[a]ny . . . other assets of any Indemnitor", which 
included MYTs then existing claims in the pending case at bar against ESI. See 
Attachment 2, Order for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment/Garnishment; 
Preliminary Injunction Freezing Assets; and Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (along with Exhibits referenced by said order); see also Attachment 19, 
Ruling on Clyde G. SeetyS Motion to Dismiss Second Amended. 
Counterclaim. 
4. Merrick Young allowed MYI to administratively dissolve in or about 
March 30, 2003. This action was consistent with the Court's order which restrained, 
enjoined and prevented MYI from selling, transferring, disposing, distributing, 
pledging, or encumbering any asset or real or personal property pending further order 
of the Court. 
5. In late fall of 2003, Developers began negotiating a release and sale of 
the Indemnitors' assets with MYI, Merrick, Stephanie and Clyde G. Seely 
*-} T> > \ k I £L-
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6. On March 22, 2004, Robert Jensen, MYPs original counsel of record 
attempted to withdraw as counsel of record in the instant litigation. See Attachment 
3, Withdrawal of Counsel 
7. On March 25, 2004, the Indemnitors (Merrick, Stephanie and MYI) 
and Seely signed a document titled Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release and 
Assignment whereby the Indemnitors assigned "any and all interests, rights and title 
to Indemnitors' assets" to Developers and Developers sold many of the 
"Indemnitors' Assts" to Seely in exchange for $150,000. Developers signed the 
Setdement Agreement on April 5, 2004. 
ESI had no knowledge of the assignment of the Indemnitors5 assets, which clearly 
included the underlying claims in the instant litigation, to Developers. 
8. On March 30, 2004, Robert Jensen advised Mr. Farley that "MYI is 
controlled and essentially owned" by the Bond Company. The letter states that the 
Bond Company owns the assets of MYI, including all accounts receivable, etc, and 
the assets of Merrick Young individually and his wife individually See Attachment 
4, March 30, 2004 letter (with attachments referenced therein). 
9. On April 5, 2004, Developers signed the Settlement Agreement, 
Mutual Release and Assignment thereby effectuating the transfer of the claims against 
ESI to Mr. Seely. 
Though fully executed on April 5, 2004, ESI was not advised of the Setdement 
Agreement. ESI did receive unexecuted copies of the document on or about November 10 
and/or November 14, 2005 when the document was produced with a production of 
documents in excess of 3,500 pages from MYI (November 10, 2005 and November 14, 
2005). See Attachment 5, produced copies of Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, 
and Assignment. 
10. On April 12, 2004, Dennis Farley sent a letter to Clark Fetzer and 
Michael Leavitt attaching the March 30, 2004 letter from Jensen. At the time the 
letter was sent, Mr. Farley's representation that MYPs Bond Company owned all its 
assets, including MYTs accounts receivable, was absolutely false as, by this date, Mr. 
Seely owned some of MYPs assets ~ including the claim(s) against ESI which are the 
subject of the instant litigation. See Attachment 6, Letter dated April 12, 2004 
(with Enclosures). 
11. On April 14, 2004, Dennis Farley filed a Substitution of Counsel and 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel. The documents were signed by Robert Jensen on 
_/ 
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March 31, 2004 and March 16,2004, respectively, and by Mr. Farley on April 6, 2004. 
It is not clear why Mr. Farley waited an additional week to file these documents. 
However, it is clear that, at the time these documents were signed and filed, Mr. 
Farley knew or should have known that MYI no longer owned the claims against ESI 
that were the subject of the underlying litigation. See Attachment 7, Substitution 
of Counsel, Notice of Substitution of Counsel and Excerpt from Docket Sheet. 
12. On September 29, 2004, Alan Young reinstated MYI and, in so doing, 
assigned himself 90,000 shares of stock thereby making himself a majority owner of 
MYI. The Application for Reinstatement identifies Alan Young as "President" of 
Merrick Young, Incorporated as do the Amended Articles of Incorporation of 
Merrick Young Incorporated. See Attachment 8, Application for Reinstatement, 
Letter of Good Standing, Amended Articles of Incorporation, Corporate 
Resolution, Oiiginal Articles of Incorporation of Merrick Young Incorporated 
and related documents for original filing; See also Attachment 9, Excerpts 
from the Deposition of Alan Young, p. 14, li 7-p. 15, li 11. 
13. Alan Young did not pay anyone for his new shares of stock in MYI. 
The remaining shares of stock are purportedly owned by Merrick Young. See 
Attachment 9 at p. 15, li. 12 -p. 16,1112. 
14. Alan Young testified, in his November 2005 deposition, that at the 
time of reinstatement, MYI had no assets. See Attachment 9 at p. 16,1116-21 
15. Despite Alan Young's representation in the corporate reinstatement 
documents as "President" of MYI, Alan Young acted evasively during his deposition 
- refusing to respond to the question of the identity of MYI's President. See 
Attachment 9 at p. 173, li. 8 -p. 176, li 4. 
16. On the contrary, Merrick Young testified during his deposition (which, 
occurred the day before Alan's deposition) that he was the President of MYI and had 
been since "about 1994". See Attachment 10, Exceipts from the Deposition of 
Merrick Young, p. 5,11 18-24. 
17. Merrick went on to testify that in 2002 - the same year the Developers 
Litigation was initiated and a few months before Merrick Young allowed MYI to 
administratively dissolve in March, 2003, - that Alan Young started Sunland 
Corporation because £T was no longer going to be in business." See Attachment 10 
at p. 124, li 25 -p. 125, li 14. 
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18. " Regardless of whether Alan Young or Merrick Young was the acting 
President of MYI following its reinstatement in September, 2004, there is no dispute 
that MYI actively continued to actively prosecute the claim against ESI by filing in 
excess of 10 motions, opposing each motion filed by ESI, issuing new discovery, 
supplementing initial disclosures and issuing in excess of 10 subpoenas. 
19. MYPs deceptive conduct did not end with its continued prosecution of 
a claim which it did not own. In the fall of 2005, MYPs counsel was forced to 
supplement discovery responses and acknowledge that Alan Young had altered 
evidence which had been produced in discovery. See Attachment 11, Letter dated 
September 6, 2005. 
20. MYI also refused to adequately produce damage information and was 
ultimately sanctioned by the Court for its behavior. See Attachment 12, Summary 
Rulings and Order and Order for Attorney's Fees. 
21. To date, MYI has never paid ESI the $11,397.62 which was awarded by 
this Court in November, 2006.1 
22. The transfer of the ownership interest of MYPs claim against ESI fully 
came to light during the continued deposition of Merrick Young on or about January 
9, 2007. Thereafter, ESI sought to resolve the question while counsel for MYI 
fought to prevent such discovery and took affirmative steps to further conceal and 
confuse the issue: 
a. ESI sought to take the deposition of Clyde G. Seely and MYI 
moved for protective order and to quash the subpoena. 
b. In response to ESPs Opposition to MYPs Motion to Quash, 
MYI claimed "Merrick Young, Inc. is the real party in interest/' Seer 
Attachment 13, Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum to Defendants' 
Opposition to Motion (with Exhibits referenced therein). By way of 
justification for this statement, MYI and its counsel of record argued: 
Utah Code Annot. § 48-2c-1302(6) authorizes a dissolved company to wind 
up its affairs and has the same power as a company to sue to collect amounts 
owed to the company and to recover property or rights belonging to the 
company. It is unknown whether Merrick Young, Inc. will have any assets to 
convey to any party under the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and 
1
 The court further awarded interest on this sum at the rate of 6.36% per annum until paid. 
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Assignment, that deteimination must await the winding up of Merrick Young, 
Inc. as authorized bylaw. 
See Attachment 13 at p. 3. 
As you are certainly aware, when these arguments were made, Mr. Farley (and/or Mr. 
Savage) knew, or should have known, that these arguments were irrelevant, not warranted by 
the evidence or existing law and were frivolous. First, MY]' was not a dissolved company. 
While MYI had been administratively dissolved on March 30, 2003; Alan Young, with or 
without the requisite corporate authority, reinstated the corporation on September 29, 2004. 
Pursuant to Utah Code § 16-10a-1422, because the reinstatement ocanTed within two (2) 
years of the dissolution, the administrative dissolution was revoked and the company was 
permitted to resume activity as if no dissolution had occurred. Therefore, contrary to 
MYPs/Mr. Farley's/Mr. Savage's argument in Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to Defendants5 
Opposition to Motion, Utah Code § 48-2c-1302(6) was irrelevant to the litigation and ESPs 
claim that MYI may not be the real party in interest. 
In addition, MYTs (and/or Mr. Farley's and Mr. Savage's) claim that no assets had yet 
been conveyed under the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment was 
absolutely untrue when made. Not only had Mr. Farley been advised by Developers that 
MYI had no assets but MYI was certainly aware of the Settlement Agreement, Mutual 
Release and Assignment, and, consistent with his testimony, Alan Young had knowledge that 
MYI had no assets when he reinstated the company The arguments made by Mr. Farley, 
Mr. Savage and MYI were clearly presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the litigation. 
c. When ESI filed a supplemental rebuttal memorandum to clarify 
the record as to the speciousness, deceptiveness and obvious inaccuracy of 
MYPs arguments, MYI moved to strike ESFs pleading. See Attachment 14, 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in. 
Opposition to Motion to Quash. 
d. Mr. Farley's, Mr. Savage's and MYPs pleadings, and claims 
asserted therein, continued to become progressively more evasive/deceptive: 
i. In response to ESPs Rule 17(a) Objection, MYI asserted 
that ESI should have been aware of the ownership of the claim 
because MYI dutifully transmitted all documents regarding the 
Developers Litigation. Houevzr, MYI (and/or its counsel) also argued 
that Developers did not acquire the claims which were the subject of 
the instant litigation and, therefore, those assets were not transferred to 
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Seely. See Attachment 15, Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants'Rule 17(a) Objection. 
ii Shortly thereafter, in Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Substitution, MYI (and/or its counsel) 
stated "Qyde Seely ("Seely7') is the present owner of MYI assets 
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement executed by MYI on March 25, 
2004. See Attachment 16, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Substitution (with Exhibits). 
23. On March 12, 2007, this Court found that "Stcly has a clear personal 
interest in the subject matter of this action and in its outcome" and joined Seely as an 
additional plaintiff. ESI was given the opportunity to serve Seely with appropriate 
pleadings and Mr. Seely was given the time prescribed by the Utah Rules of Qvil 
Procedure to respond to those pleadings. See Attachment 17, Corrected Rulings 
on Pending Motions; Associated Orders. 
24. On July 10, 2007, MYI was, again, administratively dissolved after its 
corporate officers failed to file a renewal. See Attachment 18, Business Entity 
Search Results. 
25. ESI filed its Second Amended Counterclaim in August, 2007. On or 
about August 28, 2007, counsel for ESI learned that Mr. Farley had retired and left 
this case in the hands of Jon Lear and Scott Savage. Thereafter, on or about 
September 7, 2007, Mr. Savage filed a response to ESPs Second Amended 
Counterclaim. In that Answer, MYI was again ambiguous with respect to the 
ownership of the ESI claim answering as follows: 
a. MYI admitted the entry of the March 18, 2003 Order in the 
Developers/Indemnitors Litigation, but asserted the document "speaks for 
itself55 in response to the allegations that (i) Developers was given the right to 
execute, attach and garnish on the accounts receivable, assets, interests, 
money, stocks, memberships, bonds, real property and personal property in 
which the Indemnitors had an interest; and (ii) an injunction was issued 
against the Indemnitors which precluded them from disbursing funds or 
conveying any assets. Sa?MYI Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim at fl 
21,50. 
b. Despite having produced draft documents of Release and 
Assignment Agreements, Settlement Agreements and Purchase Agreements 
and having discussed those documents in its pleadings, MYI denied having 
O r* 
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knowledge of the negotiations of the release and sale of its' assets, and the 
assets of the other Indemnitors. See MYT Reply to Second Amended 
Counterclaim at \ 23; see also Attachment 13 at Ex. H (Bates Plaintiff MYI 
11.10,05 02699-02721). 
c. MYI admitted entering into the Settlement Agreement, Mutual 
Release and Assignment, but asserted the document "speaks for itself" in 
response to the allegation that the Indemnitors assigned all their Assets to 
Developers and Developers sold certain Assets to Seely m exchange for 
$150,000. Se> MYI Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim at ffl 24, 51. 
However, MYI then inconsistently denied having real or constructive 
knowledge of the transfer of MYPs Assets and subsequent sale of MYPs 
Assets since March 25, 2004. Id at % 34. In addition, MYI denied that the 
claims alleged in the instant litigation against ESI and the other defendants 
were acquired by Developers and sold to Seely. Id at f 52. This present 
denial is particularly troublesome given MYPs previous admissions that 
"Clyde Seely ('Seely3) is the present owner of MYI assets pursuant to the 
Settlement Agreement executed by MYI on March 12, 2004, see Attachment 
16 at p. 3, % i , and Mr. Farley's letter dated April, 2004 whereby he states 
fc[t]he Bond Company owns the assets of Merrick Young Incorporated, 
including all accounts receivable, etc., and the assets of Merrick Young 
individually and his wife individually." See Attachment 6. 
d. MYI denied the existence of a controversy concerning the 
ownership of the claim, real party in interest and rights/duties and obligations, 
if any, of Seely to prosecute the instant action. MYI further denied that a 
judicial determination is necessary and appropriate to decide these issues. See 
MYI Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim at fl 55, 56, 60, 63, 64,70, 71. 
e. Contrary to MYPs former answer that the Settlement 
Agreement, Mutual Release and Assignment "speaks for itself'3 with respect to 
the ownership of the claims at issue, MYI denied that ESI is entitled to a 
declaration that Seely owns all right, title and interest in the claims. See MYI 
Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim at ^ 57. 
f. MYI denied that it had no "right, tide or interest in the Qaims 
and is not, therefore, the real party in interest." See MYI Reply to Second 
Amended Counterclaim at t59. 
g. Despite the contrary testimony of Alan Young, MYPs reinstator 
and one of its' purported Presidents, MYI denied that, at the time of 
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reinstatement MYI had no assets. See MYI Reply to Second Amended 
Counterclaim at \ 32. 
h. MYI further denied that it lacked the capacity or standing to sue 
ESI in the instant litigation and, in fact, affirmatively stated that certain actions 
(i.e., administrative dissolution, loss of its assets, Alan Young's reinstatement 
of company) did not effect MYTs standing or capacity to sue. SeeMYI Reply 
to Second Amended Counterclaim at fK 22, 26, 28,29-31. 
L Finally, MYI denied that Seely acquired the Qaims from 
Developers and either refused to respond or categorically denied that Seely 
•willfully, deliberately and fraudulently allowed MYI to pursue the litigation,2 
See MYI Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim at t152, 73. 
26. On April 28, 2008, this Court entered its Ruling on Clyde G. Seel/s 
Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim. In denying Seely*s Motion to 
Dismiss, the Court made the following specific findings: 
According to the evidence currently available to this Gourt, the facts appear to 
be as follows: The claims made in this case by MYI constituted a chose in 
action which was an asset of MYI. That chose in action was attached by 
Developers in its lawsuit against MYI and its principals, and it was transferred 
to Mr. Seely in accordance with the 'Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, 
and Assignment' signed by Mr. Seely in 2004. This litigation continued 
thereafter, with MYI continuing to prosecute the case in its own name, in spite 
of the transfer of its assets to Developers and then to Mr. Seely. 
Regardless of whether Mr. Seely covertly controlled the prosecution in this* 
action after 2004 or he deliberately or negligently allowed MYI to continue to 
control it, Mr. Seely had the right to control MYPs claims in this case. The 
specification of certain lawsuits transferred to Mr. Seely in the 'Setdement 
Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment5 does not obviate the general 
language therein which also gave Mr. Seely "Mny equity in any other . . . asset 
in which any Indemnitor has an interest" and cc[a]ny • • • other assets of any 
Indemnitor." The chose in action upon which MYI sued the defendants in 
2
 In response to the allegations specific to the claims for relief against Mi*. Seely, MYI stated: "MYI 
does not respond to the allegations in remaining paragraphs 73 - 95 of ESPs Second Amended 
Counterclaim, because the Claims for Relief and allegations therein are directed against Clyde G. 
Seely and not MYI. To the extent any of these allegations is directed at MYI, MYI denies the 
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this case is one such asset, and Mr. Seely owns it 
See Attachment 19, Ruling on Clyde G. Seelyi Motion to Dismiss Second Amended 
Counterclaim, 
27. On or about April 25, 2008, Clyde G. Seely filed his Answer to ESPs 
Second Amended Counterclaim. Therein, Mr. Seely denied being aware of MYPs 
prosecution of the instant litigation in its own name and further denied consenting to 
such prosecution/representation. Mr. Seely also affirmatively disavowed any right or 
interest in the litigation. 
28. MYI has not, to date, amended its Answer to ESPs Second Amended 
Counterclaim and despite the clear law of the case continues to claim an ownership in 
the claims against ESI. 
Contrary to representations which have been repealedly made by die attorneys of 
record in this case, MYI does not presently own the claims against ESI, the "Wal-Mart Trust 
and American Insurance Company. MYI lost those claims to Developers pursuant to an 
Order entered by Judge Beacham. Developers then sold the claims to Mr. Seely. The 
attorneys handling this lawsuit knew or should have known of the loss of the assets, knew or 
should have known of the lack of any assignment, and knew or should have known that the 
continued prosecution by MYI (which had been suspiciously reinstated by Alan Young after 
Merrick left the business and moved to Montana) was improper and unwarranted by existing 
law. 
Moreover, despite multiple opportunities for MYI and/or Seely to present 
documentary or testimonial evidence to the Court that the Qaims at issue are owned and/or 
otherwise controlled by MYI, such proof has not been made. ESI is presently reserving 
judgment on whether Mr. Seely is an innocent bystander in MYTs deception but is prepared 
to pursue the answer to that question if you (and MYI) are unwilling to recognize and admit 
that MYI has absolutely no right to continue prosecuting the instant claim. And, in addition, 
has not had such right since March, 2003 when Mexrick Young, individually and on behalf of 
MYI, acknowledged that MYI assigned all of its assets to Developers. 
Based on the foregoing, ESI can only conclude that MYPs prosecution of this claim 
after it lost the asset to Developers in March, 2004 and MYPs improper conduct throughout 
the course of this litigation3 was for the express purpose of harassing ESI and/or to cause 
3 
339^ 
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unnecessary delay in the resolution of the matter or needless (and substantial) increase in the 
cost of litigation. You should be advised that between 2004 and 2008, ESI has spent in 
excess of $800,000 in attorney's fees and costs in defending and prosecuting this case. 
MYPs continued assertion that it is a proper plaintiff and/or that it owns the claims 
against ESI are not warranted by existing law and the allegations/arguments that you have 
made in support of such claim(s) have absolutely no evidentiary support. The attorneys of 
record in this case are responsible for ESTs having incurred hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in rebutting these clearly baseless and/or fraudulent arguments. There can be no 
dispute that the pleadings that you have filed, and continue to file, are clearly in violation of 
Rule 11. 
ESI hereby requests that MYI dismiss its claims against ESI, the Wal-Mart Trust and 
American Insurance Company and amend its' Answer to the Second Amended 
Counterclaim to properly reflect it has no ownership interest in the claims against ESI and is 
not, therefore, the proper party to pursue such litigation. ESI is presendy reserving its right 
to seek sanctions against MYI and its' attorneys of record jointly for the damage caused to 
date;4 however, the failure of MYI to dismiss its5 claims within twenty-one (21) days from 
the date of this letter will necessarily ensure that ESI will move for sanctions against MYI 
and its' attorneys of record jointly and will attach a copy of this Notice to its pleading. ESPs 
sanction request will include all costs and fees related to this litigation which have been 
incurred by ESI since March, 2004, when MYI, Merrick Young and Stephanie Young signed 
the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release and Assignment confirming the transfer of all of 
their respective assets to Developers. 
I look forward to your prompt attention and response to this matter. 
Cc: Tom Hill; Rob Shockley 
4
 Utah Courts have recognized that it is proper for a trial court to enforce rule 11 sanctions after a 
party voluntarily withdraws the offending pleading/paper. Barton v Utah Transit Authority, 1994, 
872 P.2d 1036, 1040, n.L (ating Cooler & Gellv Hartmzrx Cap., 1990, 496 US. 384, 396, 110 S. Ct. 
2447, 2456), The violation of Rule 11 is complete when the party files the pleadings, motion, or 
other paper with the court, and a subsequent voluntary dismissal does not eradicate the rule 11 
violation. Id 
-*>**> t4iU ^ 
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Mchael W. Spence, Greggory J. Savage, Micliael D. Mayfield, attorneys for Clyde G. Sedy 
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Civil No. 010500909 
Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
Plaintiff Merrick Young, Inc. ("MYI") and its counsel, E. Scott Savage and Stephen R. 
Waldron of Berman & Savage, PC respectfully submit the following memorandum in opposition to 
"ESI's Motion for Sanctions Against MYI and Its Counsel of Record," filed on July 15, 2008 
("ESI's Rule 11 motion"). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Engineered Structures, Inc/s ("EST') Rule 11 motion is ESFs third request for 
sanctions under Utah R. Civ. P. 11 ("Rule 11") in this case. This time ESI seeks the sanction of 
dismissal of the Amended Complaint (as well as an award of fees and costs it has incurred in this 
case since April 2004) in an improper attempt to use Rule 11 to obtain an adjudication of the claims 
of the Amended Complaint. ESI's latest Rule 11 motion is without merit and a mis-use of Rule 11. 
ESI does not claim a Rule 11 violation in any particular pleading or filing. Instead, ESI 
claims the alleged Rule 11 violation was MYTs continued prosecution of the claims for relief of the 
Amended Complaint after the alleged April 2004 transfer of interest in those claims to plaintiff 
Clyde G. Seely ("Mr. Seely"). The central premise of ESFs Rule 11 motion is that, upon the 
alleged April 2004 transfer of interest, MYI "lost the right to continue the prosecution of the instant 
case/' (ESFs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions Against MYI and Its Counsel of 
Record ("ESFs Memorandum"), at 19.) Thus, ESI argues, MYI's post-April 2004 prosecution of 
this action allegedly had no basis in fact or law, and allegedly was merely for the purpose of delay 
and harassment, in violation of Rule 11, and the Amended Complaint should be dismissed as a 
sanction. 
However, the central premise of ESFs Rule 11 motion is wrong. MYFs continued role as 
plaintiff after the alleged April 2004 transfer of interest was proper under Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c) 
("Rule 25(c)5'), and this Court already has ruled that MYFs continued prosecution of the 
action after April 2004 was proper. 
•ii-
ESI concedes that MYI owned the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint when that 
pleading was filed, which meant MYI was the real party in interest for asserting the claims. As 
such, under Rule 25(c), MYI could lawfully continue as the sole plaintiff even if there had been a 
pendente lite transfer of interest of the claims. Rule 25(c) states, "In the case of any transfer of 
interest, the action may be continued by . . . the original party . . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c) 
(emphasis added). The Court ruled that "Rule 25(c) would allow the case to proceed with only 
MYI as the plaintiff." (5/21/07 Corrected Rulings on Pending Motions; Associated Order, at 4.) 
This is the law of the case. As such, MYTs post-April 2004 prosecution of the action was proper 
and cannot be a Rule 11 violation. ESI's motion fails for this reason alone. 
In addition, even without considering Rule 25(c), ESI has not and cannot show that MYFs 
post-April 2004 prosecution of the action was without any basis in law or fact or for improper 
purposes. Several facts show there was a valid basis for MYTs continued prosecution of the claims 
of the Amended Complaint after April 2004, even if it were wrongfully assumed that the propriety 
of that continued prosecution depended upon MYTs continued ownership of those claims. These 
facts include the following: 
(1) The agreement that allegedly transferred the claims of the Amended Complaint to Mr. 
Seely did not specifically identify those claims as being transferred; (2) Mr. Seely has taken, and 
continues to take, the firm position that he never became the owoier of those claims; (3) ESI 
continues to assert claims against MYI alone that are based upon those parties' subcontract (which 
is the basis of the claims of the Amended Complaint); (4) ESI asserts a claim for relief in its Second 
Amended Counterclaim that raises the issue of ownership of the claims of the Amended Complaint, 
-iii-
and claims there is a need for a determination of that ownership. There has not been an 
adjudication of this claim for relief; and (5) the Court has ruled that it has jurisdiction over Mr. 
Seely, based upon the Court's analysis that the claims of the Amended Complaint were transferred 
to Mr. Seely in April 2004. However, this ruling was only recently entered, on April 28,2008, and 
was entered upon a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. 
Indeed, given that the alleged transfer agreement did not specify that the claims of the 
Amended Complaint had been transferred and the person to whom the claims allegedly were 
transferred takes the position that he did not become the owner of the claims, MYI and its counsel 
had a duty, as well as a valid basis, to continue MYTs prosecution of the action after April 2004, 
even incorrectly assuming that its continued ownership of the claims mattered. Under these facts, 
there also was a valid basis in law and fact for MYPs statements and denials regarding ownership 
of the claims of the Amended Complaint, which ESI relies upon to support its failed theory that 
MYTs post-April 2004 prosecution of the action was a Rule 11 violation. 
ESFs Rule 11 motion also should be denied, and MYI should be awarded its attorneys fees 
and expenses incurred in opposing the motion (as allowed by Rule 11(c)(2) to the prevailing party 
on a Rule 11 motion), because ESI mis-uses Rule 11. 
Regardless of who owned the claims of the Amended Complaint after April 2004, MYI 
could continue as the plaintiff. The owner of the claims of the Amended Complaint was irrelevant 
to ESFs defense of those claims. Yet, ESI introduced and has vigorously pursued this issue, even 
though it had no bearing on the claims of the Amended Complaint, and now uses various MYI 
statements and denials on that issue to argue that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed as 
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a sanction (and that ESI should recover its attorneys fees incurred in pursuing the irrelevant issue). 
ESI does so when Rule 11 does not allow for dismissal of claims, and ESI does not even claim the 
Amended Complaint itself was a Rule 11 violation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
MYI and its counsel of record submit that ESI's Rule 11 motion should be denied based 
upon the following facts: 
1. ESFs Rule 11 motion is based upon its theory that MYTs continued prosecution of 
the claims of the Amended Complaint after April 2004 was wrongful and, thus, a Rule 11 violation. 
ESI argues in its Memorandum that, in April 2004, MYI "lost the right to continue the prosecution 
of the instant case," and argues as follows: 
Despite multiple opportunities for MYI and/or Seely to present documentary or 
testimonial evidence to the Court that the claims at issue are owned and/or otherwise 
controlled by MYI, such proof has not been made. MYI's continued assertion that 
it is a proper plaintiff and/or that it owns the claims against ESI, the Trust and 
American Insurance are not warranted by existing law and the allegation/arguments 
that have been made in support of such claim(s) have absolutely no evidentiary or 
legal support. Based on the foregoing, ESI can only conclude that MYTs 
prosecution of this claim after it assigned the alleged ESI account receivable to 
Developers in April 2004 was for the express purpose of harassing ESI and/or to 
cause unnecessary delay in the resolution of the matter or needless (and substantial) 
increase in the cost of litigation. 
(ESI's Memorandum, at 19-20.) 
2. MYI filed the Amended Complaint on June 7,2001, alleging claims for relief based 
upon a subcontract between it and ESI for construction work on a Wal-Mart project. ESI states in 
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its Memorandum that "ESI does not dispute that at the time of the initial filing of the Amended 
Complaint, MYI owned the alleged ESI account receivable." (ESFs Memorandum, at 6). 
3. MYI, Merrick and Stephanie Young, Developers Surety and Indemnity Company 
("Developers") and Mr. Seely entered into a "'Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, And 
Assignment" (the "Settlement Agreement") that resolved a separate action against MYI by 
Developers, who was MYI's bonding company. MYI, Merrick Young and Stephanie Young (who 
were collectively referred to as the "Indemnitors") and Mr. Seely executed the Settlement 
Agreement on March 25, 2004. Developers executed it on April 5, 2004. (Ex. A (Settlement 
Agreement) )l 
4. The Settlement Agreement stated that the Indemnitors (MYI and the Youngs) 
transferred "certain assets," comprising eight listed categories of assets, to Developers, who in turn 
assigned them to Mr. Seely (with the exception of certain specified accounts receivable that were 
retained by Developers). The eight categories of transferred assets that were listed identified 
several specific assets, including MYI's accounts receivable from several specified projects, but did 
not specifically identify the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint or funds owed MYI by ESI. 
Two of the eight categories of transferred assets were generally stated as follows. "Any equity in 
any other real property , business or assets in which any Indemnitor has an interest," and "Any 
money, stocks, bonds or other assets of any Indemnitor." (Exhibit A (Settlement Agreement), at 3, 
5-6.) 
1
 Citations to "Exs " are to exhibits attached to the Affidavit of Stephen R Waldron that is being filed with 
this Memorandum 
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5. On February 16, 2007, ESI moved under Rule 25(c) to have Mr. Seely joined or 
substituted as a plaintiff in this action. ESI argued that there had been a transfer of interest to Mr. 
Seely under the Settlement Agreement, but did not argue that MYI's continued role as the plaintiff 
was wrongful. Instead, ESI argued that Mr. Seely should be joined or substituted as a plaintiff in 
order to ensure that Mr. Seely would be liable on ESFs claims for relief asserted in ESFs then 
pending Amended Counterclaim, and in order to facilitate the conduct of the case. MYI opposed 
ESFs Rule 25(c) motion on the grounds that the time for joining new parties had passed and the 
joinder would cause unnecessary delay as Mr. Seely, if an assignee of claims, could not be liable on 
the ESI's breach of contract and specific performance claims asserted in the Amended 
Counterclaim (which were based upon the subcontract to which MYI, not Mr. Seely, was a party) 
and Mr. Seely would be bound under Rule 25(c) by any judgment on the Amended Complaint so 
there was no need to join him. (2/16/07 Motion for Substitution; 2/16/07 Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of ESFs Motion for Substitution; 3/12/07 Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Substitution.) 
6. On May 21, 2007, the Court entered "Corrected Rulings on Pending Motions; 
Associated Orders" that ruled, in part, upon ESFs Rule 25(c) Motion for Substitution. The Court 
granted the motion, ordering that Mr. Seely be joined as a plaintiff in addition to MYI. The Court 
ruled as follows: 
There is no advantage to leaving Mr. Seely out of the case, and it is far too late for 
any party to complain about delaying litigation. While Rule 25(c) would allow the 
case to proceed with only MYI as plaintiff, such a course would virtually guarantee 
future litigation among MYI, ESI and Mr. Seely. There is also an issue as to 
whether Mr Seely may be liable to ESI on some of its counterclaims against MYI, so 
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it would not be prudent to substitute Mr. Seelv in place of MYI. In the 
circumstances as they currently appear, the only reasonable course is to join Mr. 
Seely as a plaintiff. 
(Exhibit B (5/21/07 Corrected Rulings on Pending Motions; Associated Orders), at 4 (emphasis 
added.) 
7. On August 10, 2007, ESI filed a Second Amended Counterclaim. The Second 
Amended Counterclaim continued to assert claims for breach of contract and specific performance 
against only MYI, based upon the same subcontract that is the subject of the claims of the Amended 
Complaint ESI added three new claims for declaratory relief that raised the issue of ownership of 
the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint, as well as three new claims against Mr. Seely alone 
for abuse of process and recovery of attorneys fees, which are based upon the allegation that MYTs 
continued prosecution of the action after April 2004 was wrongful. One of ESFs new claims for 
declaratory judgment seeks a declaration that Mr. Seely owns the claims for relief of the Amended 
Complaint. There has not been an adjudication of any of the claims asserted in the Second 
Amended Counterclaim. (Exhibit C (8/10/07 Second Amended Counterclaim).) 
8. On September 7,2007, MYI filed a Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim. This 
was the only pleading or filing in the entire action that was signed by attorneys from Berman & 
Savage (previous to this filing). All previous post-April 2004 pleadings and filings by MYI in this 
action had been signed by attorneys from Lear & Lear. (Exhibit D (9/7/07 Reply to Second 
Amended Counterclaim); Affidavit of Stephen R. Waldron, at ^  6) 
9. On September 28, 2007, Mr. Seely moved to dismiss the Second Amended 
Counterclaim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state 
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claims for relief against Mr. Seely. Attached to Mr. Seely5 s Motion to Dismiss was a declaration of 
Mr. Seely dated September 26,2007. In that declaration, Mr. Seely declared under oath as follows: 
At the time I signed the Settlement Agreement, I was generally aware of a dispute 
between MYI, Wal-Mart and others. I did not understand that the Settlement 
Agreement gave me any right or interest with respect to the above-captioned 
litigation [the instant action] nor did I expect to receive any such right or interest. 
The first time I learned that anyone was asserting that I had any right or interest with 
respect to the litigation was when the defendants sought to join me as a party in this 
litigation. I have not at any time, nor do I now, claim any right or interest in or with 
respect to the above-captioned litigation. 
(Exhibit E (9/26/07 Declaration of Clyde G. Seely) at f 5 (emphasis added).) 
10. On April 16, 2008, the Court entered a "Ruling on Clyde G. Seely's Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim." The Court treated the motion as a Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) 
motion to dismiss, but denied it. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Mr. Seely. The 
Court's analysis, in part, was as follows: 
Regardless of whether Mr. Seely covertly controlled the prosecution of this action 
after 2004 or he deliberately or negligently allowed MYI to continue to control it, 
Mr. Seely had the right to control MYI's claims in this case. The specification of 
certain lawsuits transferred to Mr. Seely in the "Settlement Agreement, Mutual 
Release, and Assignment" does not obviate the general language therein which also 
gave Mr. Seely "[a]ny equity in any other... asset in which any Indemnitor has an 
interest" and "[a]ny . . . other assets of any Indemnitor." The chose hi action upon 
which MYI sued defendants in this case is one such asset, and Mr. Seely owns it. 
For these reasons, this Court has previously ruled that Mr. Seely as the assignee and 
real party in interest, should be joined as a plaintiff. 
This does not mean that Mr. Seely steps into MYI's shoes for all purposes. 
ESI does not seek to subject Mr. Seely to its original counterclaims against MYI, but 
ESI does assert that it has claims against Mr. Seely which accrued after he acquired 
his rights to MYI's claims in 2004. Having acquired all of the assets of MYI and its 
principals during the pendency of this action by MYI, Mr. Seely could and should 
have anticipated that this would subject him to the jurisdiction of this Court for his 
acts and omissions as to the ownership of the chose of action in this case. 
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Consequently, there is nothing wrong or unreasonable or unfair in requiring Mr. 
Seely to respond to ESI's claims, and this Court has jurisdiction sufficient to do so. 
(Exhibit F (4/16/08 Ruling on Clyde G. Seely* s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended 
Counterclaim), at 3-4.) 
11. On April 25,2008, Mr. Seely filed an "Answer to Second Amended Counterclaim." 
In this reply to the Second Amended Counterclaim, Mr. Seely denies that: (a) he owns the claims 
of the Amended Complaint, under the Settlement Agreement or otherwise, (b) he is the proper 
plaintiff on those claims, and (c) MYI's prosecution of those claims after April 2004 was improper. 
Mr. Seely affirmatively alleges that the claims against him are baned "because Seely does not claim 
any right or interest in or with respect to the above-captioned litigation." (Exhibit G (4/24/08 
Answer to Second Amended Counterclaim), at 7-9,12.) 
12. Out of the approximately 26 pleadings, motions, memoranda and objections on non-
procedural issues filed by ESI in this action on or since January 19,2007, when ESI made its Rule 
17(a) objection as to MYF s status as plaintiff in this action, 15 involved the issue of the ownership 
of the claims of the Amended Complaint. (Affidavit of Stephen R. Waldron, at If 2.) 
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ARGUMENT 
L MYFS POST-APRIL 2004 PROSECUTION OF THE ACTION WAS NOT A RULE 
n VIOLATION BECAUSE THAT CONTINUED PROSECUTION WAS PROPER 
UNDER RULE 25(c), EVEN IF THERE WAS A TRANSFER OF INTEREST 
The central premise of ESI's Rule 11 motion, that in April 2004 MYI "lost the right to 
continue the prosecution of the instant case," is wrong. It is the law of this case that MYI could and 
did properly continue as the plaintiff after the alleged transfer of interest, under Rule 25(c). 
Rule 25(c) allows a party, who was the real party in interest at the time an action was filed, 
to continue as the plaintiff even though there is a pendente lite (during the pendency of the action) 
transfer of the claims for relief. Rule 25(c) states: 
In the case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the 
original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest 
is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c). The purpose of Rule 25(c) is to allow for the original parties to continue a 
lawsuit to a determinative conclusion, despite any pendente lite transfer of interest, so as to avoid 
endless lawsuits. This purpose was noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Briggs v. Hess, 252 P.2d 
538 (Utah 1953): 
The answer to any contention that the court lost jurisdiction in the suit between Tree 
and Hess when the latter conveyed during the pendency of the action, well might be 
found in Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, designed to continue litigation 
with the same litigants to a determinative conclusion. Were it otherwise, litigation 
might arrive at a stalemate by the simple device of a conveyance pendente lite, 
resulting in a series of endless lawsuits. 
Id at 539. 
There is no question that Rule 25(c) allows an original plaintiff in an action to continue in 
that role after a pendente lite transfer of interest of the subject claims for relief. Utah R. Civ. P. 
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25(c) ("In the case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by.. . the original party" 
(emphasis added)); Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 255 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah 1953) ("We flunk 
Meagher's transfer of interest during pendency of the action does not deny him a continued role as 
plaintiff, nor does that role do violence to former Tile 104-3-19, U.C.A. 1943, or Rule 25(c), 
U.R.C.P., both of which allow prosecution of any action in the name of either grantor or grantee." 
(emphasis added)); Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 1958, at 555 
("The most significant feature of Rule 25(c) is that it does not require that anything be done after an 
interest has been transferred. The action may be continued by or against the original party . . ."' 
(emphasis added)). 
ESI concedes that MYI was the real party in interest when the Amended Complaint was 
filed. (MYI Fact No. 1 .)2 As such, MYI's continued role as plaintiff after the alleged April 2004 
pendente lite transfer of interest to Mr. Seely was proper under Rule 25(c). MYI never "lost the 
right to continue the prosecution of the instant case." 
Indeed, it is the law of this case that MYI's continued role as the plaintiff after April 2004 
was proper under Rule 25(c). Upon ESFs Rule 25(c) motion to join or substitute Mr. Seely as a 
plaintiff in this action, the Court ruled in May 2007 that "Rule 25(c) would allow the case to 
proceed with only MYI as plaintiff." (MYI Fact No. 6; Ex. B, at 4 (emphasis added).) 
Recognizing the propriety of MYFs continued role as plaintiff, the Court then ordered that Seely be 
joined as a plaintiff, in addition to MYI. (Id) 
As such, ESFs claim that MYI's post-April 2004 prosecution of the action was a Rule 11 
violation fails. ESI fails to show that there is no basis in law for MYI's post-April 2004 
2
 Citations to "MYI Fact Nos." are to the numbered facts in the Statement of Facts above. 
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prosecution of the action. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). To the contrary, Rule 25(c) and the law of 
this case applying Rule 25(c) provide a clear and certain basis. 
Moreover, because MYF s post-April 2004 role as the plaintiff was proper under Rule 25(c), 
ESI fails to show, as required under Rule 11(b)(1), that MYI's continuing as the plaintiff was for 
improper purposes. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). ESI argues that it merely assumes that MYI's 
post-April 2004 prosecution of the action was for improper purposes, based strictly upon its central 
premise that MYI's post-April 2004 prosecution was improper. (ESFs Memorandum at 19-20 
("Based on the foregoing, ESI can only conclude that MYI's prosecution of this claim after it 
assigned the alleged ESI account receivable to Developers in April 2004 was for the express 
purpose of harassing ESI and/or to cause unnecessary delay.").) Because ESP s premise is incorrect, 
its mere assumption based upon that premise that there was an improper purpose fails. 
II. EVEN WITHOUT CONSIDERING RULE 25(e), THERE WAS A VALID PURPOSE 
AND BASIS FOR MYFS CONTINUED ROLE AS PLAINTIFF AFTER APRIL 2004 
ESI also fails to show that MYI's post-April 2004 prosecution of the action was a Rule 11 
violation, even without considering Rule 25(c) and incorrectly assuming continued ownership of the 
claims of the Amended Complaint determined MYI's right to continue as the plaintiff. 
A claim, defense, legal contention, allegation or denial that has some or a possible basis in 
fact or law (including a non-frivolous argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law), such as where the law is uncertain, cannot be a violation of Rule 1 l(b)(2),(3) or (4). Utah R. 
Civ. P. 11(b)(2), (3), (4); Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86,1(28, 15 P.3d 1021 C"T]he fact that a 
complaint is dismissed for legal insufficiency or does not produce a triable issue does not 
necessarily mean that sanction is appropriate/" (citing Wright & Miller Federal Practice & 
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Procedure Civil 2d § 1335, at 67)); Utah State Bar v. Sorensen, 910 P.2d 1227,1228 (Utah 1996); 
Robinson v. Morrow, 2004 UT App 285,1J24 n.3, 99 P3d 341 (observing that Rule 11(b) "sets a 
relatively low standard requiring some factual basis after a reasonable inquiry"). 
Ownership of the claims of the Amended Complaint is a legal issue. There was well more 
than "some" basis in law for MYI's continued prosecution of the claims of the Amended Complamt 
after April 2004, even incorrectly assuming ownership of those claims determined whether MYI's 
continued prosecution was proper. This is demonstrated by the following: 
• The Settlement Agreement specifically identified several particular assets of MYI, 
including particular accounts receivable, that were transferred to Mr. Seely, but did not specifically 
identify the claims of the Amended Complaint. (MYI Fact Nos. 3-4.) 
• Mr. Seely has taken the firm position that he did not become the owner of the claims 
of the Amended Complaint under the Settlement Agreement. (MYI Fact Nos. 9,11.) 
• ESI, in its Second Amended Counterclaim, raised the issue of the ownership of the 
claims of the Amended Complaint as a triable issue of fact, and there has been no adjudication of 
ESI's claims. (MYI Fact No. 7.) Mr. Seely, in response to the Second Amended Counterclaim, 
continues to denies that he owns those claims. (MYI Fact No. 11.) 
• ESI has acknowledged that there was a basis for MYI's continued role as plaintiff. 
ESI's February 2007 Motion for Substitution did not claim MYTs continued role as plaintiff was 
wrongful and sought to have Mr. Seely joined as an additional plaintiff. (MYI Fact No. 5.) ESI 
continued to assert claims in the Second Amended Counterclaim against MYI alone, which arose 
out of the subcontract that is the subject of the claims of the Amended Complaint. (MYI Fact No. 
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7.) Also, ESI alleges in its Second Amended Counterclaim that there needs to be an adjudication 
of the issue of who owns the claims of the Amended Complaint. (Id) 
• The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Mr. Seely based upon the Court's 
analysis that the claims of the Amended Complaint had been transferred to Mr. Seely. (MYI Fact 
No. 10.) However, this ruling was only recently made, in April 2008 (after the filing of all of 
pleadings and filings that ESI relies upon to support its Rule 11 motion), and was made in a ruling 
upon a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, rather than in a summary judgment ruling. (Id) In that 
ruling, the Court acknowledged a continued role for MYI as a plaintiff. (Id.) 
Plainly, given that the Settlement Agreement did not expressly state that the claims of the 
Amended Complaint had been transferred and the person to whom those claims allegedly were 
transferred says he does not own the claims, MYI and its counsel had a duty, as well as a valid 
basis, to continue MYFs prosecution of the claims of the Amended Complaint, even incorrectly 
assuming MYI's continued ownership of those claims mattered. 
Moreover, these same facts show that there was, and remains, a valid purpose and basis in 
law and fact for MYI's statements and denials regarding post-April 2004 ownership of the claims 
of the Amended Complaint, which ESI relies upon to support its failed theory of its Rule 11 motion 
(even incorrectly assuming that ESI was claiming any of these statements or denials in themselves, 
rather than MYI's post-April 2004 prosecution of the action, was a Rule 11 violation). 
The only pleading or filing signed by a lawyer from Berman & Savage that ESI relies upon 
to support its claim that MYFs post-April 2004 prosecution was a Rule 11 violation is MYFs 
September 7,2007 Reply to ESFs Second Amended Counterclaim. (MYI Fact No. 8.) ESI argues 
that MYI's responses and denials regarding the ownership issue in this Reply were "ambiguous." 
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However, none were without basis, under the facts set forth above. Even if the Court's April 2008 
ruling regarding its jurisdiction over Mr. Seely had finally determined the issue of the ownership of 
the claims of the Amended Complaint, Berman and Savage filed the Reply for MYI well before that 
ruling, when that ownership issue would have been unresolved. 
ESI relies upon MYPs responses in that Reply to ESI's allegations regarding the Settlement 
Agreement, and the attachment order in the separate Developers' case that led to the Settlement 
Agreement, to support its theory. However, ESFs allegations went to the legal effect of those 
documents and, in response, MYI admitted the existence of both of the documents and stated that 
the documents speak for themselves. This was not a denial of a factual contention and, as such was 
entirely proper and not a possible violation of Rule 11. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(4) (stating it 
applies only to denials of "factual contentions"). ESI also relies upon MYTs denial of ESFs 
allegation that there is a need to resolve the ownership issue. This denial also was not of a factual 
contention, and it had a valid basis in law, because, under Rule 25(c), post-April 2004 ownership of 
the claims of the Amended Complaint has no relevance to the resolution of those claims. 
Moreover, ESI's allegation is directly contrary to its Rule 11 violation theory: if there is a need to 
resolve the ownership issue, then it is a valid and unresolved issue such that MYI's positions on that 
issue cannot be a Rule 11 violation. 
ESI does not even attempt to argue that the Reply, or any denial in it, was made for 
improper purposes (other than to support its presumption that MYTs post-April 2004 prosecution 
was for improper purposes because that continued prosecution allegedly had no basis in law). The 
Reply manifestly was not filed for improper purposes because ESI had asserted claims for relief 
against MYI in the Second Amended Counterclaim and MYI had to respond or be in default. 
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The other filings by MYI that ESI relies upon to support its failed Rule 11 violation theory 
likewise addressed the post April 2004 ownership issue, and likewise were not Rule 11 violations 
given the valid basis of MYI's statements and denials regarding post-April 2004 ownership of the 
claims of the Amended Complaint, discussed above. All of these filings were filed well before the 
Court's April 2008 ruling on the jurisdiction issue, even assuming it was a final adjudication of that 
ownership issue. Of course, the letters of counsel that ESI relies upon were not filings subject to 
Rule 11. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) ("By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the 
court" an attorney represents there is no Rule 11 violation); Morse, 2000 UT 86 at f 31. 
in. ESI FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE OWNERSHIP ISSUE HAD ANY 
SIGNIFICANCE AND, INSTEAD. IMPROPERLY USES RULE 11 TO SEEK 
DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST IT 
ESFs Rule 11 motion also should be denied because ESI fails to show the significance of 
the alleged mis-statements that ESI relies upon to support its claim that MYI's post-April 2004, 
prosecution of the action was a Rule 11 violation, and thus fails to show any harm or prejudice. 
Instead, ESFs Rule 11 motion is an improper attempt to obtain a disposition of the claims of the 
Amended Complaint based upon MYTs positions on an issue that has no relevance to those claims. 
Only "significant" factual errors or mis-statements may be Rule 11 violations, and only mis-
statements or errors that cause some harm or prejudice could result in sanctions. Morse, 2000 UT 
86 at 1J28; K.F.K. v. T.W., 2005 UT App 85,14, 110 P.3d 162; Utah State Bar, 910 P.2d at 1228 
("The misnomer of plaintiff in the original complaint was a teclinical error which did not cause 
appellants any prejudice "); Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 
(Utah 1976) (u[T]here should be no penalty or adverse effect for mere error which causes no 
harm."). 
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Whether MYI continued to own the subject claims after April 2004 has no bearing on 
whether it remained a proper plaintiff. See Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c). The issue of who owned the 
claims of the Amended Complaint after April 2004 has no bearing on ESI's defense of those claims. 
If Mr. Seely was the assignee of the claims of the Amended Complaint, he would be bound by the 
adjudication of those claims regardless of whether he was joined in the action. See Wright, Miller 
& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 1958, at 555 ("The most significant feature of 
Rule 25(c) is that it does not require that anything be done after an interest has been transferred. 
The action may be continued by or against the original party, and the judgment will be binding on 
his successor in interest even though he is not named."). 
Moreover, Mr. Seely has been joined. Yet, Mr. Seely was not named on ESTs claims in its 
Second Amended Counterclaim arising from the subcontract that is the subject of the claims of the 
Amended Complaint - underscoring the irrelevance of the ownership issue to the claims of the 
Amended Complaint. (MYI Fact No. 7.) Instead, ESI named Mr. Seely only on its claims that 
allege MYPs continued prosecution after April 2004 was wrongful. (Id.) 
As a result, the various statements and denials ESI relies upon to support its Rule 11 
violation theory have no significance, and ESI fails to show any harm or prejudice. Regardless of 
those statements and denials, it remained that MYI was a proper plaintiff under Rule 25(c) after 
April 2004, as demonstrated by the fact that ESI's opposing claims on the subject subcontract 
continued to be asserted against only MYI. ESI does not even claim any of the statements or 
denials that it relies upon were Rule 11 violations be themselves; ESI, instead, merely relies upon 
the statements and denials to support its failed theory that MYFs post-April 2004 prosecution of the 
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action was a Rule 11 violation. Without showing any significance, ESI fails to show it is entitled 
to any sanction under Rule 11. 
What ESI has done is introduce and vigorously pursue the issue of ownership of the claims 
of the Amended Complaint for no purpose. That issue has no impact on ESI's defense of the claims 
of the Amended Complaint. The only "substantive" result of EST s pursuit of the issue is its claims 
against Mr. Seely that are based upon its failed premise that MYTs post-April 2004 prosecution of 
the action was wrongful. A significant portion of the attorneys fees that ESI seeks as sanctions 
were incurred in pursuit of this irrelevant issue (based upon the number of its filings involving this 
issue). (MYI Fact No. 12.) Now, with the present Rule 11 motion, ESI is using MYTs statements 
and denials regarding this issue to seek a dismissal of the claims of the Amended Complaint against 
it, even though the issue has no bearing on those claims. 
The impropriety of ESI's Rule 11 motion is vividly demonstrated by the fact that, without 
precedent, ESI seeks the dismissal of the Amended Complaint as the sanction. Rule 11 does not 
allow for the "ultimate" sanction of dismissal of claims. Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) ("A sanction 
imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such 
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situation."). This is because, as ESI points out, 
Rule 11 sanctions are an entirely collateral issue and do not address the merits of a party's claims 
for relief. Barton v. Utah Transit Authority, 872 P.2d 1036,1040 (Utah 1994). Dismissal of claims 
for a Rule 11 violation would be a violation of due process. See Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. 
Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah 1995) ("'The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, 
where possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case/" (citing 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189,190 (Utah 1962)).) 
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Moreover, ESI incredibly claims the Amended Complaint should be dismissed as a sanction, 
without even claiming that any aspect of the Amended Complaint was a Rule 11 violation. Even if 
striking a pleading was warranted as a sanction under Rule 11, Rule 11 would not allow a pleading 
to be stricken that was not filed in violation of Rule 11. 
IV. MYI SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS FEES AND EXPENSES INCURRED IN 
RESPONDING TO ESPS RULE 11 MOTION AS THE PREVAILING PARTY 
Rule 11 provides that: "If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the 
motion the reasonable expenses and attorneys fees incurred in . . . opposing the [Rule 11] motion." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). See also K.F.K, 2005 UT App 85 at % 3. An award to MYI of its 
attorneys fees and expenses incurred in opposing ESFs Rule 11 motion is warranted, given the utter 
lack of merit of the motion, as shown by this Court's own rulings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, MYI and Berman & Savage respectfully submit that ESfs Rule 
11 motion should be denied in full. MYI requests an award of its fees and expenses incurred in 
opposing ESfs Rule 11 motion. 
DATED: August _£_, 2008 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
Stephen R. Waldron 
Attorneys for Merrick Young Incorporated 
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Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite"l400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dennis C. Farley 
Lear & Lear 
299 South Main, Suite 2200 
Wells Fargo Center 






CLARK B. FETZER (USB# 1069) 
RINEHART FETZER SEMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. 
1200 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phone: (801) 328-0266 ext. 103 
Fax:(801)328-0269 
KIM J. TROUT (ISB# 2468) 
VICKY J. ELKIN (ISB# 5978) 
TROUT • JONES • GLEDHILL • FUHRMAN, P.A. 
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Phone: (208)331-1170 
Facsimile: (208)331-1529 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FDJTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, a 




WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, a Delaware business trust; 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; THE AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Nebraska 
corporation; WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and 
DOES 1-100, 
REQUEST TO SUBMIT 
FOR DECISION AND 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Civil No. 010500909 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
Defendants. 
Defendant Engineered Structures, Inc. ("ESI") hereby submits for decision pursuant to 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure its Motion for Sanctions Against MYI and Its 
Counsel of Record, filed on or about July 8, 2008, and states as follows: 
1. On or about June 13, 2008, ESI served Notice upon Dennis C. Farley and E. Scott 
Savage of its intent to seek sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. On or about July 8, 2008, ESI served its Motion for Sanctions Against MYI and 
Its Counsei of "Record and memorandum in support. 
3. On or about August 7,2008, counsel for Merrick Young, MYI served the 
following documents: 
a. Merrick Young Incorporated's and Its Counsel's Opposition to ESI's 
Motion for Sanctions Against MYI and Its Counsel of Record; 
b. Affidavit of Stephen R. Waldron in Support of Merrick Young 
Incorporated's and Its Counsel's Opposition to ESFs Motion for Sanctions Against MYI 
and Its Counsel of Record; 
c. Merrick young Incorporated's Co-Counsel's Joinder in Response to ESI's 
Motion for Sanctions Against MYI and Its Counsel of Record. 
4. Rule 7(c) provides the moving party may file a reply memorandum within five (5) 
days after service of the memorandum in opposition. Rule 7(c) does not require a reply brief to 
such a response. In light of the fact that claim ownership and Rule 25 issues were thoroughly 
2 
briefed by the parties in January/February 2007 \ February/March 20072 and in 
September/October 20073, and mindful of this Court's knowledge of the proceedings which are 
the subject matter of ESFs Rule 11 Motion as well as this Court's corrected ruling on May 21, 
2007, Defendant Engineered Structures, Inc. ("ESI") hereby submits for decision its Motion for 
Sanctions on the pleadings previously filed and the record herein. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
ESI ferfeby requests a hearing on its Motion for Sanctions Against MYI and Its' Counsel 
of Record. 
DATED this £Rlay of August, 2008. 
RINEHART FETZER SMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. 
Clark B. Fetzer 
1
 See ESFs Rule 17(a) Objection, filed on or about January 19,2007, and related pleadings including, but not 
necessarily limited to: (1) Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash and in Support of Rule 
17(a) Objection, filed on or about January 19,2007; (2) Affidavit of Kim J. Trout, filed on or about January 19, 
2007; (3) [MYFs] Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants5 Rule 17(a) Objection, filed on or about January 25, 
2007; (4) ESI's Reply Memorandum in Support of Rule 17(a) Objection, filed on or about February 5,2007; (5) 
Affidavit of Clark B. Fetzer in Support of Rule 17(a) Objection/Rule 25 Motion, filed on or about February 5, 2007. 
See also (6) ESI's Memorandum in Opposition to [MYFs] Motion to Quash Deposition of Clyde G. Seely, filed on 
or about January 16,2007; (7) Affidavit of Kim J. Trout in Opposition to Motion to Quash, filed on or about January 
17,2007; and (8) Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to Defendants7 Opposition to Motion, filed on or about January 16, 
2007. 
2
 See ESI's Motion for Substitution, filed on or about February 16, 2007, and related pleadings including, but not 
necessarily limited to: (1) [ESFs] Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of ESFs Motion for 
Substitution, filed on or about February 16, 2007; (2) Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Substitution, filed on or about March 12,2007; and (3) ESFs Reply Memorandum In Support of its Motion for 
Substitution, filed on or about March 22,2007. 
3
 See Seely's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim, filed on or about September 28,2007, and related 
pleadings and orders including but not necessarily limited to: (1) [Seely's] Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim, filed on or about September 28, 2007; (2) ESI's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and in Support of ESFs Objection to Seely Affidavit and Rule 56(f) Motion for 
Additional Time, filed on or about October 18,2007; (3) Affidavit of Kim J. Trout Filed in Support of: (t) ESFs 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and (2) ESFs Objection to Seely Affidavit and Rule 56(f) Motion for Additional 
Time, filed on or about October 18,2007; (4) [Seely's] Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Second Amended Counterclaim, filed on or about October 31,2007; and (5) Ruling on Clyde G. Seely's Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim, issued on or about April 10,2008. 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of August, 20081 sent a true and correct copy of 
REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND REQUEST FOR HEARING to the parties 
listed below via U.S. Mail. 
Jon M. Lear 
Dennis C. Farley 
LEAR & LEAR 
The Downey Mansion 
808 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
E. Scott Savage 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
170 S. Main Street #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Michael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Dated this \M ^ day of August, 2008. 
dML lM^ 
Lisa A. Hilden 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT tf6k]]'*' ' U-MuHTY 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH J 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WAL-MART REAL ESTATE 
BUSINESS TRUST, et al., 
Defendant. 
t / 
CORRECTED1 RULINGS ON 
PENDING MOTIONS; 
ASSOCIATED ORDERS 
Civil No. 010500909 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
Between January and March of 2007, Plaintiff Merrick Young Incorporated 
(hereafter *MYT) and Defendant Engineered Structures, Inc. (hereafter "ESI") filed 
more than 10 motions. Since several motions were made in response to other motions, 
I elected to wait for the flow of paper to ebb before dealing with them. 
The last requests to submit for decision were filed in April. The 10 motions upon 
which I will now rule involve at least 61 individual papers, and many of those have 
numerous exhibits. ESI's attorneys provided me with a very useful list of motions and 
related papers, which has helped me and my law clerk, Kathryn Lusty, sort through 
it all. 
There were requests for hearings with respect to several motions. None of these 
motions is dispositive, however, so no hearings are required. 
Having fully reviewed each motion, I will deal with each major motion and those 
subsidiary to it as a group: 
!The name "Young'7 has been corrected to "Seeiy" in several instances. 
MYI MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
SUMMARY RULINGS AND ORDER 
In October 2006,1 issued my "Summary Rulings and Order" regarding an earlier 
group of motions from these parties. MYI now moves for relief from those Summary 
Rulings and Order pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I find no valid basis for MYFs motion. Regardless of whether the Summary 
Rulings and Order contain anything which is properly subject to a Rule 60(b) motion, 
MYI has not identified any mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect by a 
party which could support its motion. Instead, MYI argues, somewhat surreptitiously, 
that the mistake was made by me in the Summary Rulings and Order. Consequently, 
Rule 60(b) is not appropriate for the relief requested, and it would have been more 
appropriate for MYI to file a motion to reconsider which, even after Gillett v. Price, 
would be permissible with respect to the Summary Rulings and Order. 
Having also considered MYFs motion as if it were one for reconsideration, I am 
not persuaded that it should be granted. The problems created by MYFs obstructionist 
actions were fully considered last fall, and MYTs characterizations still do not change 
those problems. MYTs Motion for Relief from Summary Rulings and Order is denied, 
ESFs Motion to Strike Exhibits is moot, since MYTs Motion for Relief is denied 
regardless of the exhibits. ESFs requests for sanctions and for fees, as well as MYFs 
"Motion to Strike ESFs Request for Sanctions Under Rule 11" and "Motion to Strike 
Request for Fees Pursuant to Rule 11," are all denied. 
2 
MYTS (FIRST) MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
This motion was filed to prevent the taking of the deposition of Mr. Clyde Seely 
in another state. The motion was opposed by ESI, and MYI filed a reply and a notice 
to submit. Thereafter, a court of the other state apparently quashed the subpoena for 
the deposition, and MYI filed a notice of that order and of MYTs resulting intent to 
withdraw the Motion for Protective Order. ESI objected to the withdrawal. 
Despite ESI's desire to use its opposing materials for other purposes, I find 
nothing is left for me to consider on the merits of MYTs motion. x\ccordingly, the first 
Motion for Protective Order, and MYTs related Motion to Strike Defendant's 
Supplemental Memorandum, are both denied as moot. 
ESrS RULE 17(a) OBJECTION and 
MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION 
ESI alleges it has discovered that all of MYI's interest in the subject matter of 
its Complaint has been transferred and assigned to Mr. Clyde Seely, making him the 
real party in interest. MYI essentially concedes that such a transfer and assignment 
took place, although it asserts that it was the real party in interest when the 
Complaint was filed. As noted both above and below, some considerable difficulty has 
attended ESFs attempts to take Mr. Seely's deposition to determine the extent and 
effect of the transfer and assignment. 
After ESI made its objection to MYTs continuing as plaintiff pursuant to Rule 
17(a) and MYI filed its opposing memorandum, ESI then moved under Rule 25(c) for 
3 
an order substituting Mr. Seely as plaintiff or joining him as an additional plaintiff. 
MYI also opposed that motion. MYI filed a Request for Leave of Court to File a Sur-
Reply, but that request is contrary to Rule 7 and is denied. 
Mr. Seely apparently has a claar personal interest in the subject matter of this 
action and in its outcome. After Mr. Seely received service of all the papers related to 
ESFs Motion for Substitution, however, he filed no opposition or response. In addition, 
MYI has prevented ESI from taking Mr. Seely's deposition as a non-party witness in 
order to determine his interest in this litigation. Consequently, it is impossible for me 
to determine whether Mr. Seely claims or acknowledges any interest in the outcome 
of this case. 
There is no advantage to leaving Mr. Seely out of the case, and it is far too late 
for any party to complain about delaying this litigation. While Rule 25(c) would allow 
the case to proceed with only MYI as plaintiff, such a course would virtually guarantee 
future litigation among MYI, ESI and Mr. Seely. There is also an issue as to whether 
Mr. Seely may be liable to ESI on some of its counterclaims against MYI, so it would 
not be prudent to substitute Mr. Seely in place of MYI. In the circumstances as they 
currently appear, the only reasonable course is to join Mr. Seely as a plaintiff. 
Accordingly, ESFs Motion for Substitution is granted, and Mr. Seely will be 
joined as an additional plaintiff. ESI may serve Mr. Seely with appropriate pleadings 
and Mr. Seely may have the time prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for 
4 
^*in& 
response. If Mr. Seely fails to make an appearance, he may be considered to be an 
involuntary plaintiff and discovery may be obtained from him under the rules applying 
to any other party. 
MYI'S (SECOND) MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
The assignment of rights and transfer of assets by MYI to Mr. Seely, as noted 
above, remains somewhat unclear in its details. Although the timing is contested, ESI 
asserts that it first fully understood MYTs assertions about the assignment in early 
January 2007, a few days before the fact discovery deadline of the current Case 
Management Order. ESFs first attempt to take the deposition of Mr. Seely would have 
been successful, within the deadline, except that it was defeated when MYI obtained 
orders from a court in another state preventing the deposition. 
ESI again hopes to take Mr. Seely's deposition, but MYI has again sought a 
protective order preventing the deposition. MYTs only argument now is that the fact 
discovery deadline has now passed. MYI fails to acknowledge that it obstructed the 
taking of Mr. Seely's deposition before the deadline had passed. MYI also failed to 
certify, pursuant to Rule 26(c), that it "has in good faith conferred or attempted to 
confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court 
action." It appears from the record of this case that MYI would be unable to so certify. 
I am satisfied that the deposition of Mr. Seely is a necessary step toward the 
resolution of this action. MYFs prevention of that deposition, followed by its present 
5 
attempt to take advantage of a deadline which passed only because MYI prevented ESI 
from taking the deposition, appears to be another instance of the obstructionist tactics 
against which I warned MYI in my Summary Rulings and Order last October. 
Accordingly, MYI's motion is denied, and my Rule 11 order to MYFs attorneys 
appears below, 
ORDERS 
In relation to the foregoing rulings on 10 pending motions, and due to the 
manner in which they were presented, the Court hereby orders: 
A. ESI's Motion for Substitution is granted, and all other motions are denied. 
B. For the duration of this action, the parties shall not: 
1. Attempt to file any document by facs Lmile. 
2. Pile any papers which are not attached together with staples or 
other appropriate binding materials, which shall not include 
"bulldog" clips or other impermanent fasteners. 
3. Pile any exhibits without attaching them to an affidavit providing 
an evidentiary foundation therefor. 
4. File any motions to strike in response to or in opposition to any 
other motion, memorandum, or affidavit, 
5. File any request to submit an over-length memorandum. 
6. File any request to submit a "sur-reply" memorandum. 
6 
7. File any request for an expedited hearing or decision. 
C. Since it appears to me that MYFs attorneys have opposed the deposition 
of Mr. Seely for the improper purposes of preventing legitimate discovery by ESI, 
causing unnecessary delay, and needlessly increasing the cost of this litigation, and in 
doing so have made frivolous arguments to me, Mr. Farley and Mr. Savage are hereby 
ordered to appear before this Court on Wednesday, June 6, 2007 at 11:00 a.m. to 
show cause why they have not violated Rule 11(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 2 l _ day of May, 2007. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on t h i s / f e day of f}i(XM^. 2007,1 provided true and 
correct copies of the foregoing CORRECTED RULINGS and ORDERS to each of the 
attorneys/parties named below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's 
Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in 
the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Dennis C. Farley 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
299 South Main, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
E Scott Savage 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
170 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Clark B. Fetzer 
Attorney for Defendants 
3 Triad Center, Suite 175 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Defendants 
P O. Box 9695 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Terry L. Wade 
192 East 200 North, 3 rd Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
CLERK OF COURT 
8 
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Clark B. Fetzer (USB# 1069) 
RINEHART FETZER SMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. 
1200 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phone: (801) 328-0266 ext. 103 
Fax: (801) 328-0269 
Kim J. Trout (ISB# 2468) 
TROUT, JONES, GLEDHILL, FUHRMAN, P.A. 
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Phone (208) 331-1170 
Facsimile (208) 331-1529 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, a Delaware business trust; 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; THE AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Nebraska 
corporation; WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and 
DOES 1-100, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER DENYING ESI'S 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST 
MYI AND ITS COUNSEL OF RECORD 
Civil No. 010500909 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
Fi'lFD 
'«• ty DISTRICT COURT 
*WWRI3.JW|| :2 6 
The Court has considered ESPs Motion for Sanctions against MYI and Its Counsel of 
Record. Having reviewed the voluminous materials in support, and the considerable materials 
filed in opposition, the Court finds insufficient evidence of violation of Rule 11(b). The motion 
for sanctions is denied. The parties shall bear their own costs and fees for the motion. 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly 
determines that there is no just reason for delay of an appeal of this Order, and expressly directs 
entry of a final judgment in favor of Merrick Young Incorporated as to the motion for sanctions. 
DATED: V T ^ ^ X 
HONORABLE G. RAND BEACHAM 
Fifth District Court Judge 
U-tl 
